The rabbis continue their discussion about when it permitted to move things that have parts (ie. can be assembled or disassembled) on Shabbat. In the context of this argument, we are reminded that Rabbi Yochanan stated the principle that the halacha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna.
We are told the story of Rabbi Abbahu, who would move an oil lamp when at Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's home and would not move an oil lamp when at the home of Rabbi Yochanan. How could he speak out of both sides of his mouth? Perhaps he defers to the opinion of each rabbi when in his home? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Abbahu's opinion follows Rabbi Shimon (who permitted moving the oil lamp on Shabbat). However, in deference to Rabbi Yochanan he would put aside his own judgement.
The Gemara discusses what should be permitted regarding different types of lamps. The conversation turns to other vessels, and then bracelets, nose-rings and other rings. They cannot be worn in the public domain on Shabbat, but they may be moved and are not set aside. The rabbis then discuss animals that are set aside until they develop a blemish and candles that cannot be moved until they have burned out. It is argued that these two things cannot be compared because we can predict when a candle will go out.
A question arises regarding nullifying vows. We know that a husband is permitted to nullify his wife's vow within one day of learning about that vow. If she vows not to eat a particular food on Shabbat and he nullifies that vow, does the vow still stand? If she had set her mind on setting aside the food, then the food should remain set aside over Shabbat. The Gemara argues that according to the halachot of vows, although the husband should not nullify her vow, he may also dissolve the vow by turning to a court of three common people who will dissolve it.
We are reminded that Rabbi Shimon allows us to move a lamp on Shabbat after the light has been extinguished. This is likely not because he is afraid that the light will be extinguished unintentionally. Instead, he stated the principle that an unintentional act - a permitted action that causes an action prohibited on Shabbat to occur - is permitted. A person may drag a bed, chair, or bench on the ground as long as one does not intend to leave a furrow in the ground. Even an inadvertent furrow is not a problem. His opinion is that intention is a hugely significant factor. This too is up for debate.
Rava reminds us about selling clothing that combines wool and linen, a hybrid that is forbidden by Torah law. Rabbinic law teaches that sellers can wear these items to sell them but Rava teaches that more pious people hold those garments on a stick. As long as one does not intend to benefit from them from them (shading from the sun or protecting from the rain), it is permitted to wear them ab initio.
I began Daf Yomi (Koren translation) in August of 2012 with the help of an online group that is now defunct. This blog is intended to help me structure and focus my thoughts as I grapple with the text. I am happy to connect with others who are interested in the social and halachic implications of our oral tradition. Respectful input is welcome.
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