Bechorot 13: On the Option of Decapitation of the Donkey

Today's Misha teaches us that if someone prefers to not exchange his firstborn donkey with a lamb, the donkey is redeemed and decapitated (Shemot 13:13, 34:20).  It is said that mitzvah ha podia kodemet lemitzva arid, the commandment to redeem to redeem [the donkey] is preferred over the mitzvah to decapitate.

Does this mean that decapitation is also a mitzvah in this context?  This is argued rigorously rabbis including the Rambam and the Ra’avad, where mitzvah arifa, the mitzvah of decapitation, is not literal instruction but used to question mitzvah pediya, the mitzvah to redeem.

The rabbis debate about how the Torah could offer a hypothetical option.  One example might be offering yibum, leverage marriage where a childless widow is offered to her widower's husband for marriage, over chalitza, a ritual that frees the widow to marry whomever she'd like.  Both are certainly competing mitzvot, though even today we learn that chalitza is preferred by the rabbis.

Steinsaltz reminds us that the kabbalistic teaching by Radbaz is that decapitation of the donkey should not be read as damaging the animal.  Instead, it should be understood as transporting the animal to a higher level of existence.

Bechorot 12: What Can/not be Exchanged for a Donkey for a Priest?

Shemot (13:13) has taught us tat a first born donkey is exchanged for a lamb that is then given to a priest.  Today's Mishna teaches that a lamb or a kid are appropriate for this exchange.  However, a car or an undomesticated animal cannot be used.  As well, a hybrid (cross between two species regarding chromosomes) or a koy cannot be used for this exchange.

The rabbis discuss the fact that sometimes different animals mate successfully and sometimes they miscarry or their babies are born stillborn.  The koy, a chayya or hehema, or a unique creature has not definite English translations.  Especially in Massekhet Bikkurim, the rabbis use the koy as an example a cross between a wild animal and a domesticated animal.  Thus it could be a test case for many different halachot.  Steinsaltz teaches that the debate around its identification began around the time of the Mishna.  Some Sages believed that a koy was the cross between a deer or similar animal with a goat while others argued that a koy was a unique animal, an Ayal ha-bar.

Berochot 11: When Does Possession of a Designated Lamb Take Place?

In daf 9, we learned that if the lamb set aside to redeem a firstborn donkey were to die, one is permitted to benefit from the animal's carcass.  Today's Gamara consider other possibilities.  The first is if the lamb died while it was in the possession of the priest and the Mishna is teaches that the priest is permitted to benefit from the animal, it would be obvious for it is his own money.  The second is if the lam died white in the possession of the owner and that the priest is permitted to benefit from it, this would also appear to be obvious.  The Gemara concludes that as long as the animal has not reached the priest's hands, he does not really possess it.  Thus from the time that the owner has set aside an animal, it is already considered to be in the possession of the new owner.

In our next Mishna in daf 12,  the Chachamim agree with the opinion that as soon as one sets aside the lam, even if it dies, the owner is not responsible to replace it.  Tosafot rule that that the blessing on this mitzvah, "... Who has sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to redeem a firstborn donkey", is actually recited when the lamb is set aside and not when the trade occurs.

According to the acharonim, it is forbidden to derive benefit from the donkey before the redemption takes places.  Thus we should consider the lamb to be a replacement for the donkey, and the lamb should remain forbidden until it is accepted by the priests.  Because this is not the Halacha, the lamb is viewed as possession of the priest immediately after being set aside.

Bechorot 10: Redeeming - and not Redeeming - Firstborn Donkeys

We learn in Shemot (13:13) that if the owner of a firstborn donkey does not wish to redeem it by exchanging it for a lamb, then the donkey is killed by decapitation.  The Gemara teaches a baraita that shares these Rabbi Yehuda's details on this act: he breaks its neck from behind with a kufitz, cleaver, from the back and buries it, and no benefit can come from it.  Rabbi Shim on permits one to derive benefit from it.  "He must not kill the donkey with a reed, nor a sickle, nor an ax, nor a saw, nor starve it in a room a lone, to shear it or use it for labour.  Again, Rabbi Yehuda teaches these rulings while Rabbi Shimon permits it.  

The Gemara decides that that their disagreement refers to a living animal.  The first part refers to monetary benefit and the second part refers to the benefit derived from its body (its wool or work).  Again, Rabbi Shimon permits use of the firstborn prior to decapitation and Rabbi Yehuda forbids deriving such benefit.

In Rambam's Mishnet Torah (Hilchot Bikkurim 12:2) rules along with Rabbi Yehuda and agrees that if the firstborn is sold, the money from the sale is forbidden.  The Ra'avad argues that there are two situations where a forbidden object transfers its status to money for which it is exchanged: avoda zara, idol worship, and shevi'it, agricultural laws.

In his Mishneh Torah, the Rambam (Hilkhot Bikkurim 12:2) rules like Rabbi Yehuda and says that if the firstborn is sold, the money derived from the sale is forbidden. The Ra’avad questions this ruling, arguing that there are only two situations where a forbidden object transfers its status to money for which it is exchanged – avoda zara and shevi’it.

Rabbi Akiva Eger suggests that this case may be unique.  When it comes to firstborn donkeys, deception does not remove the prohibition.  Thus it is permitted to transfer that deception does not remove the prohibition.  

Rashi suggests another possibility regarding monetary benefit.  Payment may be made when the animal is rented.  A sold animal is not mentioned and thus money may not be intrinsically forbidden that a penalty could be imposed on the owner.  Since he wanted to cause a loss to the kohen, he is made to lose out.

Bechorot 8: Kosher, Non-Kosher Fish, Dolphins and Mermaids

Part of today's Gemara tells us that the Sages taught a non-kosher fish will spawn but a kosher fish will lay eggs.  Animals that give birth to its offspring also nurses them.  Animals that lay eggs gathers food and feed their young except for the bat, for though it lays eggs, it nurses its young.  Dulfanin, also called the sons of the sea, are said by Rav Yehuda to reproduce like people.  

The Carilaginous fish is an example of a non-kosher fish where a fertilized egg develops I n the body of the mother while offspring are born as live fish.  Kosher fish are said to lay eggs that develop and then hatch over time.

Steinsaltz notes that some of these statements are generally true.  We are introduced to thoughts about dulfanin.  Are these dolphins?  Similarities between humans and dolphins include long shows of affection before mating, mating while facing each other, nursing, helping one another, and helping people in distress in the water.  

Rashi suggests that dulfanin reproduce from people.  This the Gemara is discussing mermaids, or sirens - creatures half human and half fish - that have sexual intercourse with people.  Ancient literature and myth are a notable example of discussion of such creatures.

Bechorot 7: When Offspring are Questionably Kosher

We learn that if a kosher animal looks like a non-kosher animal, it is kosher as long as its father was kosher.  If the father was non-kosher, the offspring is non-kosher.  The Gemara wonders whether a non-kosher animal could impregnate a kosher animal.  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi states that this cannot happen (nor can an a large animal from a small one, a domesticated animal from an undomesticated one, an undomesticated animal from a domesticated one excepted in one case discussed by Rabbi Eliezer.

Perhaps the father animal was a kalut, one born of a kosher animal but without split hooves.  The rabbis discuss what should be done in such cases.  We can be certain of the kashrut of these animals, regardless of the appearance.  For example if the offspring does not look like the kosher mother but looks like a camel or a donkey.  If a fetus does not look like an animal at all; it looks like a bird or a lizard, it is not considered viable and thus not kosher.

Bechorot 6: Using the Word 'Et' to Interpret Halacha

Today's daf lists forbidden animals.  When speaking of the et hagamal, the camel (Vayikra 11:4), Rabbi Shimon taught of the law that prohibits drinking milk from a non-kosher animal: the addition of the word et.  Other believe that this is not a valid interpretation  because they reject the notion that the word et can be used to teach Halacha.  Et is not translatable to English; it is used in certain grammatical situations.  

A baraita teaches that Shimon or Nechemia HaAmasoni learned the laws from every et that appeared in the Torah.  Once he came to the passage HaShem Elokecha tira (Devarim 6:13), one should be in awe of G-d, he stopped his practice.  He could not think of an appropriate thing to learn from the word et.  His students asked what should be done with his earlier teachings, he said that they would not be rewarded for distancing themselves from his teachings.  Rabbi Akiva used the et to teach that Torah scholars themselves should be included in the list of those who are held in awe.

The rishonim asked why Shimon HaAmasoni finds difficulties only at that particular passage.  What about Devarim (6:5), v'ahavta et HaShem Elokecha, you should love HaShem you G-d?  The Maharsha are sure that that Shimon HaAmasoni knew that it was imperative to love Torah scholars which could be derived from that pasuk.  It was awe that created problems for the scholar(s).

Bechorot 5: Count of the Levi'im

The Gemara tells us that a Roman, Kontrokos, asked Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, "in the detailed record of the numbering of the Levites, the total is twenty-two thousand three hundred, but the sum total is only twenty-two thousand.  Where are the other three hundred?"  Rabban Yochanan responded that the sum total only includes the Levites who redeemed the Israelite firstborn.  The remaining three hundred were Levite firstborn - and one such person cannot relinquish the sanctity of his status. Abaye comments it is enough for a Levite firstborn to abrogate his own firstborn sanctity. 

Counting by family Gershom initially counted seven thousand and five hundred (Bamidbar 3:22).  The families of Kehat were eight thousand and six hundred (Bamidbar 3:28) and those of Merari were six thousand and two hundred (Bamidbar 3:28).  The total was twenty-two thousand and three hundred.  At the end of the counting, three hundred were missing.  Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai explains that the last number is an introduction to the following discussion in the Torah.  That discussion is about the the requirement of exchanging Levi'im for the firstborn bechorim.  In the Talmud Yerushalmi, this discussion as about the participation of the firstborn in sacrificing the Golden calf, and the Levites did not participate in that transgression. 

The Maharsha notes that this was not an innocent question of Kontrokos.  It was an accusation that Moshe Rabbeinu had purposefully reduced the number of Levites so that more firstborn would need to pay the redemption fee of five shekels.  Moshe's brother Aaron would have been the beneficiaries of this deceptive move.  It is notable that the stereotype of Jew as money focused.

Bechorot 4: When Did the Bechorot Become Sanctified?

Were animals sanctified from the time that the Jews were in the desert?  Or was it later in time that the animals became sanctified?  Rabbi Yochanan quotes Shemot (13:2) where one is required to sanctify the firstborn of humans and animals and thus concludes that the laws of bechor happen in the desert.  Reish Lakish argues that the end of that passage in Shemot teaches that the laws of bechor only apply when the Children of Israel are within the Land of Canaan (13:11-12).

The Rambam interprets Shemot (13:11) as saying that the firstborn are sanctified if they were alive at the time of the Exodus. This celebrated that they were saved while the Egyption firstborn were killed in the final plague.  Regardless, the obligation to apply this sanctification to future generations did not  take effect until after the journey into the desert had ended. 

Rabbi Yochanan debates: a barita states that before the Tabernacle was built, the sacrificial service in the desert took place on private altars by the firstborn.  Reish Lakish retorts that this only refers to the firstborn who were already alive at the time of the Exodus.

Steinsaltz teaches us that the sacrificial service in the desert performed by the firstborn was based on a passage in Shemot (24:5) where we learn that when Torah was given on Sinai, there were a group of "young men" who brought sacrifices.

Bechorot 3: Co-Ownership of a Donkey by a Jew and Gentile - How to Manage Bechor

Massechet Bechorot is about bechor, the redemption of the firstborn.  Our first daf began with a Mishna regarding a firstborn donkey, a non-kosher animal.  If a Gentile owns an animal, it is not subject to the laws of bechor.  These include a firstborn male that must be redeemed by his father, a firstborn male animal that is sanctified from birth and thus must be sacrifice, and a firstborn male donkey that must be exchanged for a lamb for sacrifice by a kohen.

Today we learn about a circumstance where a Jew and a Gentile co-own the animal.  Rabbi Yehuda orders that the Jew is obligated to pay half of the value of the firstborn to a kohen.  The Sages argue that the animal is entirely free from the laws of bechorot.  Rav Huna says that even if the Gentile only owns the animal's ear, there is not mitzvah of bechor.

The Geara teaches about a woman who converted to Judaism whose gentile brothers gave her animals to fatten and then would divide the profits with her.  She came to Rava to confirm her obligation regarding bechorot.  Rava told her that there is no authority that pays any attention to Rabbi Yehuda's ruling that an animal co-owned by a Jew and a Gentile is subject to the laws of the bechor.

Steinsaltz adds that conversion to Judaism was infrequent in Babylonia.  The Persian government discouraged such behaviour.  Regardless, during Rava's time (the reign of Shevor Malka - Shapur) we learn about a number of conversions taking place in Rava's hometown of Mechoza.  It is suggested that this might be connected to the positive relationship between the Shevor Malka, the kind, and the Jewish community leaders in Babylonia at this time.

Chullin 142: Living a Good and Long Life

Today we end Massekhet Chullin with yet another Mishna regarding shilu'ach ha'ken, removing a mother bird from her nest before taking the offspring.  This Mishna teaches that fulfilling this mitzvah ensures a long life (Devarim 22:7).

Devarim (5:15) includes a similar guarantee, "your days may be long and that it may go well with you" if you observe kibbud av va-em, respecting your parents.  This is taught by Rabbi Ya'akov who once saw a child sent by his father to perform the mitzvah of shilu'ach ha ken and who died while performing two mitzvot - shilu'ach ha'ken and kibbud av va-em.  Rabbi Ya'akov suggests that the guarantee is one's share in the World to Come.

We are reminded that Massechet Kiddushin (39) teaches that this was the point where Tanna Elisha ben Avuya, also known as Acher, the Other, left Judaism (when learning of seeing this tragedy).

The rishonim note that in Chagiga (14), we learn that Acher's statement of heresy stemmed from a different incident.  Acher was one of the aria she'nichnisu ba-pardes, the fours tanaa'im who studied esoteric secrets of the Torah.  Acher apparently looked into heaven and found Archangel Mitatron, one who was writing the merits of the Jewish people.  The Midrash teach that Mitatron is the one angel responsible for the entire world.  Seeing Mitatron made Acher. believe that there were two G-ds, the Gnostic belief at the time.

We learn from Steinsaltz that the rishonim believed that Acher was a heretic from multiple angles.  The Iyyun Ya'akov says that Acher's experience in the pardes led to a questioning of beliefs.  He remained a practicing Jew hoping that he would receive reward for his action.  After learning about the incident described in today's Gemara, he lost faith in reward and punishment in heaven, and he rejected Judaism fully.

It is interesting to note that one would be. assumed to lose his or her faith in Judaism after learning that reward and punishment is unfair.  Today's world hardly considers whether or not consequences are meted out in a World to Come.  Instead, we base our beliefs on what seems logical to our individualistic sensibilities.

Chullin 141: Not Fulfiling the Mitzvah of Shiluach ha'Ken

Today's Mishna teaches that if someone takes the mother bird together with her offspring, Rabbi Yehuda asserts that he has prohibited a negative mitzvah based on Torah and is liable to receive lashes.  That person must also let the bird go.  The Sages argue that the bird must be let go but the person is not liable to receive lashes.  This leads the Sages to a ruling:
one does not receive lashes for transgressing any negative precept that can be corrected by the subsequent fulfilment of a positive commandment.

The Gemara shares the story of a man who clipped the wings of a mother bird before letting it go.  He let it go and then caught it again.  Rav Yehuda had him flogged and ordered him to keep it until it grows its wing feathers again and then release it.

The commentary notes that Rav Yehuda's ruling does not follow either of the Mishna's opinion.  He rules that he should receive lashes; the Sages rule that he must not receive lashes but let the bird go.  The Gemara teaches that Rav Yehuda accepted the view of the Sages. The lashes were makkat mardut mi d'rabbanan, lashes ordered by the rabbis for rebelliousness rather than Torah law requirements.

Steinsaltz teaches us that the Talmud Yerushalmi notes the differences between Biblical and Rabbinic lashes. Biblical lashes are up to 39 strikes and are administered after determining how much suffering the person can endure without dying.  Rabbinic lashes are given until the person accepts the rabbinical ruling or the court's requirement.  According to the Shitta Mekubetzes, it matters whether or not one is sinning in an ongoing way.  The purpose of rabbinic lashes is to convince one to repent. One who commits a sin just once receives rabbinic lashes as punishment.

Chullin 140: Father Birds and the Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken

Our daf begins with questions about when a bird must be sent away - must it be a kosher bird? Sitting on kosher offspring?  Must the bird be alive or undamaged?  Must the birds sit directly on their offspring?  In Mishna 138, Rabbi Eliezer asserts that a male bird that is nesting must also be sent away before taking its chicks/eggs.  The Sages disagree; only a female bird must be removed from her nest before taking her offspring.

The bird used as an example is called a koreh, a sand partridge or ammeoperdix, a type of pheasant. Steinsaltz teaches us that these were common in the Jordan Valley and around the Dead Sea, which is why they were often used as examples in the Torah. Both the father birds nested and the mother birds nested the eggs/chicks of other birds.  

Based on these distinguishing features, Rabbi Elazar makes two statements about the disagreement between Rabba Eliezer and the Sages:

• Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree only regarding a male koreh; the mitzvah of shilu'ach ha'ken, removing the mother bird before taking her offspring, applies even if the mother is nesting another' offspring
• Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree specifically regarding a male koreh; the mitzvah of shilu'ach ha'ken does not apply to other male birds

This conversation is a window into the perceived gendered experiences of those deemed 'male' and those deemed 'female' in the times of the Torah.  In today's world, it would be open to wide question whether or not a nesting father would not also benefit from the mitzvah of shilu'ach ha'ken.  Don't fathers suffer as much as mothers if their offspring are taken away?  Perhaps the rabbis were focusing on the specific words of Torah, but their interpretations were based on the assumptions of their time and place regarding gendered roles.

Chullin 139: Required to Find a Mother Bird and her Offspring?

Yesterday's Mishna began discussion about the Torah law forbidding taking eggs or chicks without sending away the mother bird first (Devarim 22:6-7).  Today the Gemara explores the words that introduce the mitzvah, "If a bird's nest happens before you on the way..."  The rabbis recognize that it is a positive commandment to send the bird away, there is no requirement to search for a nest.  Only if one happens to come across a nest does the mitzvah apply.

Rabbi Yair Chaim Bachrach argues in his responsa, Chavvot Ya'ir, that if one comes across a mother sitting on her eggs or her chicks, he would be required to chase away the mother and take the offspring even without any use for them.  This is because the Torah directive does not free a person from the obligation to fulfill the positive mitzvah.

The Chazon Ish argues that we are meant to search extensively to ensure that one might complete this mitzvah.  His argument is that the Gemara is is only using this passage we would have assumed that everyone is required to perform this mitzvah at least once in his or her lifetime.  Searching would be necessary.  

In the end, the rabbis determine that the mitzvah is only obligated on someone who truly wants the eggs or the chicks. 

Chullin 135: Reishit HaGez, the Offering of Shearing

Today begin's Massekhet Chullin's 11th Perek.  We first are reminded of Devarim (18:3,4) where the butcher is called to offer the zero'a, foreleg, lechayayim, jaw, and kevah, maw, as offerings and Reishit HaGez, the Halacha obligating those who shear sheep to share that shearing with the priests.

In Yoreh De'a (333:11), the Shulchan Aruch teaches that the wool should be given at the beginning of the shearing, though it would  be permitted if offered at any time.  There is a debate regarding whether the first sheep sheared should be the one whose wool is shared.  Some believe that it should be done at the beginning, after five sheep have been sheared, but not at the end.

We learn from the Mishna that this law only applies to sheep.  There is no requisite amount of wool to be given, but the Sages ruled that it should be worth at least five sela in the area of Judea.

The rabbis discuss this mitzvah.  Rambam argues that because the kohanim did not receive their share in the land of Israel, we are all obligated to care for them.  That is why they receive teruma in bread, wine and meat and why they are given the zero'a, lechayayim, kevah and eat the Temple sacrifices.  Reishit HaGez provides their clothing.