Me'ila 8: The Difficulty of Melika, Slaughtering a Bird Sin Offering

Today begins Perek 2,  where we learn about how the laws of me'ila affect sacrifices that are permitted and are sacrificed on the altar.  The first Mishna tells us about the laws regarding sin offering brought from a bird.  After the bird has been consecrated, the laws of me'ila apply and continue to remain even after the slaughter via the process of melika*.  Once the blood has been placed on the altar, the kohanim can eat the bird's meat and the laws of me'ila do not apply any longer.

The process of melika was a challenge.  We learned in Zevachim 64 that Rav Zutra bar Toviyya quoted Rav's instructions: a priest would hold the wings with two fingers and the legs with two fingers to leave the neck of the bird stretched out to be sliced by the kohen's thumbnail.  Rav Obadiah MiBarenura and the Rambam explain that the priest would hold the bird in his left had and would perform melika with the thumb of his right hand, similar to the Temple service where both hands are used.  

It is difficult to even imagine how hard it would be hold a bird and cut its neck with one hand.  Understandable that the rabbis would suggest a second interpretation allowing both hands to be used. 

*the process by which a bird sin offering is slaughtered

Me'ila 7: When Meat or Sacrificial Portions are Used Improperly

Today we learn a Mishna discussing the effects of sprinkling the blood of different sacrificial animals.    The kodashei kodashim, holiest sacrifices, like sin offerings, guilt offerings and burnt offerings are the holiest offerings. Sprinkling their blood brings with it both stringencies and leniencies.  When considering kodashei kalim, simple offerings like peace offerings or thanksgiving offerings, only stringencies are brought about when their blood is sprinkled.

Before sprinkling the blood of kodashei kodashim, the laws of me'ila (forbidding inappropriate use of sanctified objects) apply to both the meat of the sacrifice and its eimurim, portions, because they are all kodashei HaShem, holy to G-d at that time.  After sprinkling the blood, the meat is permitted to the priests and the laws of me'ila do not apply to the meat, but the laws stay in effect regarding the portions, which will remain sanctified.  

When it comes to kodashim kalim, they are not considered to be kodashei HaShem.  The meat of the sacrifice and the limbs will go to the altar.  After the blood has been sprinkled, the laws of me'ila do apply to the eimurim that will be placed on the altar.  The meat of the sacrifice is permitted for consumption, and the laws of me'ila do not apply.  

Steinsaltz shares with us the rabbis' consideration of the etymology of the word eimurim.  The Aruch teaches that its root is morim, rulers, as these are the most important parts of the sacrifice.  The Ramban says that its root is amar, to say or command, as G-d commanded us to make these sacrifices on the altar.  Still others believe that the root comes from the idea that the limbs are set aside and raised up to honour G-d (Devarim 26:17).

Me'ila 6: Are New Prohibitions Subject to the Laws of Me'ila?

We understand that me'ila, benefiting from consecrated objects, applies when we are not permitted to benefit from that object otherwise.  An example is the sprinkled blood of the sacrifices: it is not subject to the laws of me'ila once that sprinkling has taken place.  

Today's daf includes a Mishna where a case is shared: the sacrifice was removed from the Temple before the sprinkling of blood.  Rabbi Eliezer rules that in this case the sacrifice is disqualified and the sprinkling held no meaning and the meat never was allowed to the priests, thus the laws of me'ila stay in effect.    Rabbi Akiva argues that sprinkling is meaningful and the sacrifice is treated as an ordinary sacrifice, and so the laws of me'ila do not apply, but other laws do:

• the laws of piggul, abhorrent sacrifices where the intent was to perform the sacrifice at the wrong time
• the laws of notar, a left-over sacrifice
• the laws of tameh, a sacrifice that became ritually defiled

The Rabbis ask how Rabbi Akiva's opinion might apply to this case.  The meat of the sacrifice is forbidden to anyone after it has been taken out of the Temple area, and so we do not apply the general principle of ein issur chal al issur, we do not add new prohibitions to already existing prohibitions.  New prohibitions might be added because they are:

• Issur kollel, inclusive prohibition where there is no extra prohibition added and instead the new prohibition broadens the contexts of the existing prohibition and its category is now included under the original prohibition
• Issur mosif, an additional prohibition where the prohibition does not fall under a larger category.  

Because the laws of piggul apply to parts of the sacrifice that were not removed from the Temple, the new prohibition applies to more than the old one did and thus it must be significant.

Me'ila 5: Cleaning Clothing that is Holy because it was Touched by Sanctified Blood

Today's daf is based on verse 6:20-21 of Vayikra: when discussing a korban chatat, a sin offering, "Whatever touches its flesh will be holy, and if any of its blood is sprinkled on a garment, you will wash it in a holy place.  But the earthen vessel where it is cooked will be broken, and if it is cooked in a brazen vessel, it will be scoured and rinsed in water."

We learn that sacrificial blood is to be treated as holy.  The laws pertaining to the sacrifice will be transferred to whatever its blood touches unless it is cleaned properly.  We learn that clothing had to be washed in the Temple courtyard and metal vessels could be heated until the blood was gone, but earthenware vessels soak up the blood and so they must be destroyed.  

Today's Gemara quoted a Mishna that limits this law: it only applies to blood that can be sprinkled on the altar.  If the korban was disqualified for some reason (if the sacrifice was disqualified at some point, if the meat was left past its appointed time, if it left the courtyard, etc.), its accidentally spilled blood did not need to be cleaned.  Sacrifices were never good if they were slaughtered in the wrong place or time, or if the blood was collected by someone forbidden to participate in the sacrificial service.  This blood need not be cleaned, either.

It is fascinating to try to understand what is permitted and what is forbidden when it comes to something as sacred as blood.  How could it be that some blood is holy and some blood is not?  I am inspired to read something more specifically focused on rabbinical understandings of blood and sanctity (with particular interest in menstrual blood).

Me'ila 4: When are Sacrifices Permitted to the Priests?

Once an animal is permitted for personal use, it is not required to meet the laws pertaining to me'ila.  On today's Gemara, Rabbi Yehoshua summarizes this law:

     "Rabbi Yehoshua set the general rule: Whatever has once been permitted to the priests
      is not subject to the laws of sacrifice, and anything that has not been permitted to be
      used by the priests is subject to the laws of sacrifice.  What does it mean to say that 
      something has had a period of fitness for the priests?  That which stayed overnight or
      became defiled or was taken out of the Temple courtyard What does it mean to say that 
      something did not have a period of fitness for the priests?  That which was slaughtered
      after its proper time or outside its proper place, or the blood that was received and 
      sprinkled by an unfit priest."

Bar Kappara discussed the notion of "being permitted to the priests" with his nephew, bar Pedat.  Bar Kappa asked whether this referred to the slaughter of the animal, the sprinkling of blood, or actually being permitted to eat the animal.

After the slaughter, the animal is permitted to the priests because the Temple service is only for them at this time.  After the sprinkling of the blood, the animal will be shared by the priests.  Is receiving the blood enough to consider the meat to be possessed by the priests, or is it necessary to wait until the sprinkling for the transfer of possession to take place?

Me’ila 2: Prohibitions Against Deriving Benefit from Consecrated Objects Are Rabbinical

Today begins Massechet Me'ila, which is based on the prohibitions against deriving forbidden benefit from a consecrated object.  We learn that this also applies to kodashei HaShem, things that have been made holy (Vayikra 5:15-16), including sacrifices, meal offerings, things that are exchanged for money that is used to uphold the Temple.  

The first Mishna teaches us that when a sacrifice becomes disqualified before its blood is sprinkled on the altar, the animal remains holy and the laws of me'ila continue to apply to it.  For example, we are told that we cannot derive benefit from the kodashei kodashim, consecrated offerings like sin or guilt offerings, if they were slaughtered in the wrong part of the Temple courtyard (the south rather that the north as required).

The Gemara suggests that a case like this we use the laws of me’ila on a rabbinic level and not a Torah level.  The rabbis compare this case with one where Rabbi Yochanan is quoted by Ulla: the laws of me'ila do not apply on a Torah level, but the rabbis decree that they are valid on a rabbinic level.

We are reminded that there is a principle regarding rabbinic decrees if they are enacted in common situations: it is not necessary to create decrees that apply only in unusual situations.  The Perush Kadmon tells us that even though it would be unusual for the animal discussed above to be slaughtered in the wrong area of the Temple courtyard, the Sages enact the decree because of the importance of consecrated objects - and of course, the rabbis would not want anyone to derive benefit from them. 

Karetot 28: Yisachar ish Kfar Barkai and the Seriousness of Sacrifices

Today's daf is the last of Massechet Karetot tells us stories about Kings and High Priests of the Hasmonean dynasty.  Unlike other times in the Torah when we learn about the Hasmonean 'triumph' over the Greeks, today's daf tells of the lack of respect for both Jewish traditions and for the Temple service.  

A barite tells us about four cries heard in the Temple courtyard.  Yissachar ish Kfar Barkai wrapped his hands in silk while performing the Temple service, meaning that he did not think that the avoda, work, of the Temple service was worth making his hands dirty.*  The Gemara then explained that Yissachar is Kfar Barkai went to the king and queen who were arguing about whether sheep or goat meat was better to eat.  They called in an expert - the Kohen Gadol, who dealt with sacrifices every day.  Yissachar ish Kfar Barkai responded lightly, saying that the korban tamid, the daily sheep sacrifice, was better because of its frequent use.  The king disagreed and ordered that the Kfar Barkai's right arm be cut off as punishment for his lack of respect for the king.  

The amora'im answer: although Kfar Barkai was not politically astute, he was also incorrect regarding the quality of meats.  Rav Ashi notes that that a Mishna teaches that they are of equal importance.  Ravina infers the same conclusion from Biblical passages. 

Rabbi Yehudah Bacharach finds a teaching through this story.  One who brings a sin offering may bring a sheep or a goat.  A sheep could be a sin offering or a voluntary sacrifice.  A goat lets people know that the sacrifice is a sin offering.  He suggests that Yissachar ish Kfar Barkai did not note whether the repentance process should include a public admission of guilt, or whether repentance can be done while hiding one's sin. 

In this last daf, we are reminded of the importance of interpreting Torah with the utmost seriousness.  That is particularly interesting at the end of a Massechet that was focused on very small variances in offerings.  We learn that we should always be taking Torah seriously, regardless of how easy it might be to find reason to poke fun at some interpretations or discussions.

*In a different context, this might be interpreted as one who does not wish to touch the holy Torah with his imperfect or dirty hands

Karetot 27: The Status of a Sacrifice Not Yet Brought to the Temple, pt. 2

Today's daf is the second to last of Massechet Karetot.  The rabbis ask what should be done with an animal that has been set aside as a sacrifice when the owner then dies?  The Mishna teaches us that the person's son cannot bring that sacrifice in his father's place.  

Rambam (Commentary to the Mishna) says that this is obvious because in daf 21 we learned that an animal prepared for sacrifice is left to die as a tereifa if its owner dies.  Perhaps this means that the son cannot use the sacrifice of his own should his father die.  Tosafot Rabbeinu Peretz teaches that we need to be taught this law because it is not obvious that the son would not stand in his father's place.

The Mishna focuses on the status of a sin offering.  A similar law applies to an asham, a guilt offering.  If the owner of the sacrifice dies, the animal cannot be sacrificed.  It will be put to pasture until it develops a blemish, making it impossible to sacrifice.  At that point it is redeemed and another sacrifice will be purchased with that money.  Other sacrifices including an ola, burnt offering, and shelamim, peace offering, must be sacrificed by children of the one who died.  The sacrifices will not be done in his name, however.  Massechet Zevachim (5b) discusses in greater detail whether the sacrifice should be viewed as belonging to the child or the person who has died.

Keritot 26: The Asham Taluey and Atonement on Yom Kippur Regarding Women and Miscarriage

Today's daf discusses some of the differences and similarities between the asham taluey and the atonement offered on Yom Kippur.  Our Mishna yesterday's day taught that if we are obligated to bring an asham taluey and we do not do so until Yom Kippur, we have the opportunity to atone on Yom Kippur instead of bringing the offering.  Every other sacrifice must be brought even if Yom Kippur comes and goes. Rabbi Elazar notes that in Vayikra (16:30), we learn that "For on this day shall atonement be made for you, the cleanse you; from all your sins shall you be clean before the Lord."  We are taught that Yom Kippur offers atonement for sins that only G-d knows - these are the sorts of questionable sins which are known by G-d.

In the Gemara we are affronted with whether or not this would include the sin offering brought by a woman who is  uncertain whether she is obligated to bring the korban chatat after giving birth - if she miscarried and she is unclear whether the embryo had developed to the point where she is obligated to bring a korban (a sheep in its first year as a burnt offering and a dove as a sin offering).  Is she freed from her obligation if only G-d knows whether or not she is truly obligated?

Rav Hoshaya says that she must bring the sacrifice because not all sin offerings are brought to atone for sin.  A woman after childbirth brings a sacrifice as part of her purification ritual so that she is again able to enter the Temple and eat sanctified foods.  Yom Kippur cannot atone for errors regarding ritual purity laws.

Karetot 25: When the Asham Taluey is Obligated or Optional

We know that there are three ways to use the law of asham taluey, provisional offerings.  These are:

• Rabbi Eliezer: an asham taluey can be donated at any time whether or not one knows they have sinned
• Bava ben Buta: an asham talen cannot be donated unless there is a possibility that one has sinned
• The Sages rule that an asham taluey is only brought when one believes that s/he might have transgressed a sin which is punishable by karet

The question here is whether or not an asham taluey is understood to be an obligatory sacrifice or a sacrifice that is optionally donated.  From the Gemara in Chullin (41b) we learn that if we slaughtered an animal today without an altar in our Temple, we ignore the person's intention and the animal is kosher for consumption.  This is only the case when one believed his/her sacrifice to be obligatory.  Otherwise s/he would have seemed to have sacrificed outside of the Temple area.  As well, in Massechet Chullin, we are told that one can bring an asham taluey as a sacrifice.  This is Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in today's Mishna.

Karetot 24: Two Cases: When Animals Have Been Set Aside Without Need

Daf 23 of Massekhet Karetot introduced our final perek.  It began with a new Mishna regarding the conflicted views on a korban taluey, a provisional offering, this time one brought by one who does not know whether or not he has sinned.  The focus in our Gemara is on one who puts aside an animal for this sacrifice and then learns that s/he has not sinned after all.

Rabbi Meir ruled that that the sacrifice had been brought in error and this the animal can be returned to its herd without its redemption.  The Sages say that we treat these animals like any other sacrifice which cannot be brought.  That is, we leave it alone until it develops a blemish that stops it from being qualified for sacrifice.  It is then redeemed and the money earned is given to the Temple to use for a different sacrifice.  

Today is not filled with argument but with agreement/ we are told about a number of cases where Rabbi Meir and the Sages accept each others' rulings.  Rabbi Meir agrees that the sacrifice will continue to be holy after animals have been set aside.  Rabbi Yehuda says that the Sages agree that the animals can be returned without redemption as long as there were not two witnesses lying in their testimony about the the asham taluey.  

The Gemara argues that in the first case, obviously the person feels guilty.  Thus even if the sacrifice is not necessary, the sanctity remains.  In the second case, the individual was not aware of a transgression and relied on the testimony of others, and thus the sanctification was not wholeheartedly embraced - their testimony might have been wrong.  Thus at the time that we know that the sacrifice was unnecessary, we also learn that it was not truly sanctified from the start.

Karetot 22: Blood Loss at the Time of Death

How do we know which blood is forbidden to consume when we are only told that it is the blood that comes out at the time of death?  Rabbi Yochanan describes it as "the blood that spurts forcefully" while Reish Lakish says "from the last black drop onward".

Rashi gives further detail. He says that when the arteries are cut, the blood that escapes is first dark and then is red.  In the second stage, it is more forceful in its second stage, and then eventually the force weakens and the blood leaves the body gently.  Rabbi Yochanan believes that only the blood that leaves the body forcefully is the "life blood", while Reish Lakish says that the blood that leaves the body after that last black drop is the "life blood" and thus forbidden.

 Rabbi Zeira offers another argument: even though the Mishna is clear that inner organs do not hold blood that makes one who consumes it liable to receive karet, blood in the animal's heart "absorbs" the forbidden blood and thus it is off limits.

Steinsaltz goes on to describe the scientific process of sudden blood loss, including the state of hypovolemic shock followed by contracting blood vessels (to lead blood to the heart).  The heart's right ventricle then creates a vacuum to draw blood from the veins so that as little blood is lost as possible.  This would be a physical explanation of Rabbi Zeira's commentary about the blood held in an animal's heart.

Karetot 21: Consumption of Whose Blood?

Perek V focuses on the prohibition against consuming blood that was mentioned at the beginning of this massechet.  In the Mishna, one is only liable for karet after consuming the blood of birds or animals that is released when the animal dies.  Sefer Vayikra (7:26) seems to forbid all types of blood, but a baraita teaches that blood found in eggs, fish blood, kosher grasshopper blood and human blood is not actually biblically forbidden.

The Gemara clarifies further.  Fish and grasshopper blood are not forbidden at all, though they are forbidden if placed in a cup for mar'it ha'ayin, they would have the appearance of forbidden blood.  If one left a fish scale in the cup, it would be clear that the blood was not of an animal and thus it would be permitted.  Once the blood has left a human body, there is a rabbinic prohibition against consuming it.  One need not be concerned about swallowing blood from bleeding gums.  However, if someone is eating and finds that one has bled on their food, the blood must be removed before continuing to eat.

Even though we know that appearances are important because of mar'it ha-ayin, Rashi teaches that a person can swallow blood in one's mouth because it cannot be witnessed.  Tosafot state that this is only the case when dealing with mar'it ha-ayin is connected with a biblical prohibition.  Human blood is not mentioned biblically and thus this concept does not apply.

Karetot 20: Un/Intentional Lighting and Extinguishing Charcoal on Shabbat

Today we examine the prohibitions against lighting a fire and extinguishing a fire on Shabbat: are these actions punishable by karet if they are done unintentionally?  The Gemara quotes a baraita where the rabbis discuss one who might bring two sin offerings because one put out upper coals and kindled the lower coals.  Was only one of these intentional?  Was this a blacksmith who needed the lower coals to be kindled and so he put out the upper coals knowing that this would set the lower coals on fire?  Is he liable or exempt from both sins?

Steinsaltz teaches us that charcoal was often used to fuel very high temperatures.  Charcoal is made by heating wood until it is completely carbonized - carbon and inorganic ash remains.  Bricks are put on the charcoal to raise temperatures even higher by depriving the charcoal from oxygen.  The blacksmith in this case example would have wanted to use the large pieces of wood at the top and not the smaller pieces of charcoal at the bottom.

Karetot 19: When That We Sinned but not How We Sinned

Today we learn a Mishna that presents a new twist when considering the application of an asham taluey, provisional sacrifice.  What should be done when it is clear that a forbidden act has been performed but it is unclear what the forbidden act might be.  There are three cases:

• One does not know which one of the two forbidden foods was eaten, chelev, forbidden fats and notar, sacrificial meat that was not eaten when it should have been eaten
• One engaged in sexual relations with a woman in his house and he knows that it was his wife who was niddah, menstruating and thus off limits, or his sister
• Yom Kippur either preceded or followed Shabbat and one worked during the intervening twilight period but it is not clear on which day the work was performed

One note - how in the world would one not know whether he had sexual relations with his forbidden wife or his forbidden sister?  People have different bodies, energies, ways of moving, smells, and much more.  Could any person be so excessively inebriated or otherwise unaware that he could actually have intercourse with his sister?  Does this case example suggest that women would initiate intercourse with a man who is not able to make such a discernment?  This case is either completely theoretical or it is terribly insulting to all people involved.

Rabbi Eliezer requires a korban chatat, an ordinary sin offering, in such cases because it is clear that one performed a forbidden act.  Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees, arguing that in ordinary cases a person knows how s/he has sinned.

Rabbi Yehoshua believes that a korban chatat is not required but that one might be required to bring an asham taluey.  Usually one brings an asham taluey in situations of doubt, and these cases seem to be situations of doubt.  

In Vayikra (5:17) the Torah tells us, "And if anyone sin and do any of the commandments of the Lord that are not to be done, though he does not know it; yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity."  Rabbi Yehuda teaches us that that Rabbi Yehoshua allows a sinner to walk away without even bringing an asham taluey.  Rabbi Shimon argues that in these cases, one has sinned in just the manner described in Vayikra (5:17).  

Karetot 18: The Final Words on Bringing an Asham Taluey, a Provisional Offering

Today's daf continues yesterday's conversation regarding the specific conditions when bringing an asham taluey, provisional offering.  As part of this discussion, the rabbis refer to a future Mishna, Karetot 25, where there are three approaches listed regarding the application of an asham taluey.  These are:

• According to Rabbi Eliezer, an asham taluey can be given at any time even if there is no proof that one has sinned at all
• Bava ben Buta teaches that an asham taluey can only be brought if it is possible that one has sinned
• The Sages rule that one only brings an asham taluey in a case where one believes that s/he has transgressed a sin where s/he would be liable to receive the punishment of karet

Karetot 17: When do we bring an Asham Taluey, a Provisional Guilt Offering?

Yesterday's daf Karetot 17, spoke to the transgressions of Shabbat which would make one liable to different consequences.  Today's daf introduces Perek IV.  Our first Mishna discusses the rule of asham taluey, provisional guilt offerings, which are not clearly connected to specific transgressions.  Our rabbis have associated asham taluey with the sacrifices brought after a person does something that was forbidden by Torah with the consequence of a korban chatat, a sin offering, if one had known that the act was prohibited.

The rabbis disagree about much uncertainty must be present to obligate a person to give an asham taluey, but they agree that in the case of chaticha chat mi shtei chatichot, one piece of out two.  This means that the sacrifice is only brought when the rabbis are questioning whether or not a forbidden act was performed.  If we are not sure whether or not the act is permitted, there is no asham taluey.  

We are given a case example: a person has two pieces of meat where one is permitted and the other is forbidden and we are certain that s/he ate one piece but we are unsure which one.  Another example is when we are certain that the eaten piece is forbidden but we are not sure whether or not the person ate at least an olive-bulk.  In both of these cases, an asham taluey is offered.  If we are not sure whether or not the piece is forbidden, however, there is no asham taluey.  Instead it is a case of haticha echad, a single piece.

Rabbi Eliezer disagrees.  He rules that one who eats the chelev, forbidden fat, of a koy, an animal that is difficult to define - likely a deer/goat cross or an ayal habar, a unique animal, is required to bring an asham taluey.

Karetot 15: Skin Conditions and Removing Limbs

Today's day includes a number of Mishnayot that list questions to Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua by Rabbi Akiva.  An example of one is below:

What is the status of a dangling limb of an animal? Does it impart ritual impurity like a the 'imperfection' of a severed limb? Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case, but we have heard with regard to a dangling limb of a person that it is ritually pure. In Jerusalem, people who have mukei shechin, boils, would do the following in Jerusalem: Each would go on the eve of Passover to the doctor, who would cut the limb with boils almost completely and leave it connected only by a hairbreadth of flesh so that neither would be rendered impure by a severed limb. Then the doctor would impale the limb on a thorn attached to the floor or wall and the afflicted would pull away from the thorn, thereby completing the severing. In this manner both that man and the physician could participate in the Passover offering. And it seems to us that your case may be derived from this by a kal va-chomer, an a fortiori conclusion.

In the Mishna, 'shechin' might includes a number of different ailments beyond boils. It is possible that the reference here is to leprosy, which is mistakenly the common translation for the Biblical tzara’at.  In Steinsaltz's notes, we learn more about leprosy: it affect the skin and the nerves, leading to changes in the sensory experience of cold, heat and pain.  One suffering with leprosy might experience severe damage including burns or deep cuts, resulting in infection that requires the removal of a limb.   

Rashi says that the removal of the limb was done for aesthetic reasons.  He explains that the limb was removed in the described way so that it would stay in a state of ritual purity (as long as it was attached to the body).

Karetot 14: Issur Chal al Issur and Issur Motif

Yesterday's Mishna noted that a person can eat a single olive bulk of meat and be liable for four separate chatat, sin offerings, in addition to an asham, guilt offering.  These are because if a person was ritually impure and ate chelev, forbidden fat that was notar, left over from a sacrifice past the time that it could be eaten, so it was from an animal that was sanctified for the altar on Yom Kippur.

The separate offerings would account for:

• eating forbidden fats
• eating meat from a sacrifice after the time that it was permitted
• eating sanctified meat while ritually impure
• eating on Yom Kippur

This person must also bring a guilt offering for me'ila, having taken from the sanctified animal.

Rabbi Meir shares that if it was Shabbat and this person walked into the public domain with the meat in his/her mouth, s/he would be obliged to bring a fifth chatat for carrying into the public domain on Shabbat.  

Our daf seems to be a case of issur chal al issur, prohibitions that are piled on top of each other.  Rabbi Meir rejects this.  The Rambam responds: the Gemara assumes that the whole anonymous Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Meir.  The Gemara goes on to explain that while Rabbi Meir does not believe that issur hal al issur, yet he agrees with the idea of issur motif, prohibitions that add just an element of additional limitation.

In the case presented to us, the basic prohibition is that we are not permitted to eat forbidden fat.  When a person becomes ritually impure, s/he cannot eat sanctified meat.  Thought the forbidden fat was first only forbidden for eating, once the animal was consecrated it became forbidden to derive any benefit from the meat.  And when the meat was not eaten within the proper time from, it became forbidden to everyone.  Because each of these prohibitions includes more than the previous one, all of the prohibitions take effect.  

Karetot 13: Drunkenness in the Temple

In Vayikra (10:9) we learn that we cannot perform Temple services while inebriated.  Yesterday's Mishna spoke of one who drank a revi'it, a quarter of a log, of wine and the entered the Temple and stayed there for long enough that keday achilat peras, enough time/consumption has happened and the accused will be liable for punishment.  Rabbi Elazar argues that if he does not drink all of the wine or if the wine was mixed with water, he is not liable.  

A barita is quoted by the Gemara regarding Viyikra's quotation.  We learn that Rabbi Elazar's teaching is grounded on his interpretation of the pasuk where drinking wine is forbidden if it is drunk in a manner that will lead to drunkenness.  If it is diluted or if the drink is consumed slowly,  he will not be liable.  Rabbi Yehuda has a different interpretation: a person who drinks wine and entree the Temple will be liable to receive a death penalty.  Drinking other intoxicating beverages is not permitted, either, but there is no death penalty associated with the transgression.

The Gemara teaches another of Rabbi Yehuda's baraita:  someone who eats a de'veila ke'ilit and drinks honey or milk before entering the Temple to perform the service will be liable to receive lashes.  

The Gemara identifies another baraita with Rabbi Yehuda’s teaching. According to the baraita, someone who eats a deveila ke’ilit, a dried fig from Judea, and drinks honey or milk before entering the Temple to perform the service will be liable to receive lashes.  This is because the sugar in these figs would ferment quickly and turn to alcohol.  If the liver could not process these sugars quickly enough, the user might experience nausea and dizziness like what some experience after drinking alcohol.

Karetot 12: Olive Bulks, Egg Bulks, Volume and Time Measurements

Today's day examines measurements regarding eating.  We have learned about this before, but not in the context of applying the punishment of karet.  There will be a certain amount of food that must be eaten to fulfil a commandment, for example, after reciting ha'motzi lechem min ha'aretz, for commanding us to eat bread from the earth, and for eating something forbidden, for example eating something on a fast day.  We look at the volume of the food and the amount of time we spend eating. Generally, eating is measured as consuming k'zayit b'cheday achilat peras, an olive bulk over the time it takes to eat a half loaf of bread.

Peres is based on the root 'p r s', to break, and so the word peras means a broken piece, agreed to mean half of a loaf.  But how large is the loaf?  Rashi says that the loaf is the size of eight eggs and thus the peras is the size of four egg-bulks. The Ramban says that the loaf is the size of six eggs and so the peras is the size of three egg bulks.  

The rabbis also argue about the volume of an egg bulk.  It might be 40 cubit centimetres or 100 cubit centimetres.  That would be one monster egg.

And of course, the rabbis disagree about the time that it should take to eat this amount.  Their arguments consider using the size of an average person or, alternatively, using a subjective standard for each individual.  The Gemara continues this discussion, debating the time it might take to walk half of a Roman mil, mile, which might be nine minutes.  However, in other places it might be the amount of time that it takes to walk 200 amot; approximately two minutes.  

The Halacha seems to vary between these two extremes.  This is another set of laws that demonstrate the plasticity of Torah law depending on time, place, experience, personality, bias, and interpretation.

Karetot 11: Witnesses, Accusations and Sacrifices

Perek 3 begins today and the rabbis focus on the korban hatat, sin offering.  Which are the transgressions that result in the requirement of a sin offering?  An example can be found in Vayikra (4:28), where the sinner must be aware of his/her transgression.  However, in many cases this will happen with the information provided by witnesses.  Does testimony require two witnesses?  Is the testimony valid if the witness is not usually qualified to testify?

Our Mishna teaches that if witnesses testify that on ate forbidden fats, the accused must bring a sin offering.  If one witness testifies to this transgression, the accused does not need to bring a sin offering.  If one witness says yes and the other says no, an asham taluy, a provisional guilt offering, is required.  This offering is brought when one is unsure of whether or not the case requires a sin offering.

If a person denies the witness's testimony and insists that s/he did not sin, Rabbi Meir says s/he must bring a sin offering.  This is because the testimony of witnesses would require a death penalty because they were claiming that he sinned intentionally, and so a mitigated punishment is appropriate.

Tosafot state that we never force someone to bring a sin offering because we cannot force someone to atone when s/he is not interested in atonement.  This case is different because the accused wants atonement while claiming that s/he has not sinned.  The court accepts the witness testimony and requires the sacrifice.