We begin with Gemara that comments on a Mishna in daf 49. That Mishna notes that if a man betroths a woman based on a spoken fact about himself that turns out to be incorrect, the betrothal is nullified. This is the case even if the woman wishes for the betrothal to be valid. The Gemara uses this opportunity to consider the ramifications of the phrase, "unspoken matters that stay inside one's heart are not significant matters". Must all assumptions be spoken aloud when we create a contract? How do we know/evaluate what one has assumed if that assumption is unspoken? What are reasonable assumptions? Does it matter if facts change because of something beyond one's control?
A number of examples demonstrate the rabbis' process of inquiry. My favourite: if a man refuses to free his slave or divorce his wife, he can be coerced to do so by the rabbis. In such a case, the man states that he wishes to emancipate someone while his heart holds 'unspoken' wishes. Are those wishes insignificant? The Gemara teaches us that such a man in fact agrees with the recommendations of the rabbis, for all people wish to perform mitzvot, including the mitzvah of listening to the words of the Sages. Thus he truly wishes to acquiesce, even though his heart tells him otherwise.
Other examples include the actions of an agent who follows directions incorrectly, and those who prepare to make aliyah (move up to Israel) and then do not do so. The Gemara considers intention in all of these cases. The rabbis also discuss whether or not the facts changed based on something outside of the person's control. Should the sale of property outside of Haaretz be nullified if a person could not leave his country due to a circumstance beyond his control? Was that circumstance truly beyond his control, or might his heart hold a desire to stay in his own country?
A new Mishna teaches us that a man who sends an agent to betroth a particular woman in a particular place, that is exactly what the agent must do. If he betroths her on behalf of this man in different place, the betrothal is not valid. However, if a man sends an agent to betroth a particular woman who lives in a certain place, that agent can find and betroth the woman wherever she is found. The agent is bound to the specific directions of the person who sends him. The Gemara notes that the delivery of gittin have similar limitations. It also teaches us that the rabbis believed that betrothal could be done anywhere, but that divorce was a 'degradation'. Because people might think badly of one who divorces, delivering a get might be done in a specifically non-threatening location.
Another new Mishna creates greater nuance. If a man betroths a woman who says she has no outstanding vows but he learns that this is false, they are no longer betrothed. Learning about these vows after they are married is grounds for divorce, for the assumption is that he would not have married her had he known about her vows. The same guidelines apply for a man who betroths a woman who does not tell him of her blemishes. When he learns of them, the betrothal is nullified or, if they are already married, he is permitted to use this as grounds for divorce. A 'blemish' is said to be anything that would disqualify a priest from any sort of Temple service.
And yet another new Mishna in amud (a) teaches us about betrothal costs and gifts. A woman is not betrothed if a man betroths her and another woman simultaneously with an item worth less than one peruta each. She is also not betrothed if her individual item is not worth at least one peruta. This is the case regardless of other betrothal gifts that might be sent to her. A minor who betroths a woman and then sends gifts later, when he is of age, is not betrothed. That is because a minors actions are not valid legal actions and thus he cannot betroth himself to anyone.
The Gemara notes that although these cases are similar, they must all be mentioned because of significant differences. The underlying point, however, is the notion of intention verses action. Although a man might intend to betroth a woman through gifts, it is the exchange of one item at the time of betrothal that confirms that betrothal. Further, the importance of custom, minhag, is stressed. In some minority places, gifts are sent after the betrothal. Perhaps we are learning about the halachot for the minority. In most places, gifts are presented before the actual betrothal. Based on our notes in Steinsaltz, it almost seems that the rabbis wish to ensure that community members who are gossiping about a betrothal are speaking about a valid betrothal and not one that will be nullified.
A final Mishna in today's Mishna-heavy daf: If a man betroths two woman simultaneously and they are forbidden to him, for example, a mother and a daughter or two sisters, he is not betrothed to either of them. Similarly, if he betroths five women with a basket of figs, and two of the women are either sisters or mother and daughter, and one woman accepts the basket on behalf of all five of them the betrothal is void - at least for those who are forbidden to him. The rabbis have different opinions - some believe that none of the betrothals is valid.
The Gemara reminds us of the origin of these forbidden sexual relationships. Some rabbis believe that these cases referred to concurrent rather than simultaneous betrothals. According to this opinion, the betrothals were achieved through sexual intercourse. Thus there would not be a violation of Torah law, punishable by karet, until the man actually had intercourse with the second woman of the pair of forbidden relations.
One of the most interesting pieces of learning today was the importance of noticing the small, off-side commentary within the main narrative. Sometime the rabbis share their wisdom about a relatively obscure topic while discussing other matters. Without reading the entire daf, we miss out on these little gems. I'm afraid that even when I do read the entire daf, I miss much of this important information!
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