Kiddushin 34: Excluding Women from Positive Time-Bound Mitzvot

The topic of today's daf has been discussed for thousands of years.  I have books on the subject.  We continue to debate these ideas.  Our daf helps us understand some of the logic behind our traditions, but it does not speak to the rabbis' context to begin with.  But more on that later.

The Gemara points out that women are exempt from observing positive, time-bound mitzvot.  These are commandments about things that we must do, rather than commandments about things that we must not do.  Time-bound refers to mitzvot that must be performed at a particular time of day.  There are practical reasons that might exclude women from positive time-bound mitzvot, like responsibilities for children or intermittent states of ritual purity each month.  However, such issues are not necessarily limiting.   

The Gemara first gives examples of positive mitzvot that are not time-bound, like sending a bird from its nest to avoid having it witness the death of its chicks, or affixing a mezuza.  

Next, the Gemara asks if women are in fact excused from positive, time-bound mitzvot.  It names a number of such mitzvot that women are obligated to perform.   These include eating matza on the first night of Pesach, assembling at Sukkot, and rejoicing at Festivals.  Thus how can we say that women being excuses from positive, time-bound mitzvot is a principle?

Apparently, the word "all" in a general statement (in a Mishna) might still have exceptions.  These statements are not over-arching.  A proof is found in Masechet Eruvin, where a Shabbat boundary can be extended by any food except for water and salt.  Oh, and mushrooms and truffles.  And these last two examples prove that the generalized statement is not overarching.

Much of the remainder of the daf relies on proofs based on juxtapositioning. When two verses are stated close to each other, the rabbis draw inferences about further interpretations.  Just like women are exempt from Torah study, women are exempt from donning phylacteries. If they choose to juxtapose phylacteries with mezuzot, however, then women could be permitted to don phylacteries for they are permitted to affix mezuzot.  The rabbis note that because phylacteries and Torah study are mentioned in the first and second paragraph of the shema but phylacteries and mezuzot are mentioned only once in the second paragraph, exemption is the proper interpretation.

From here the Gemara goes on to challenge that interpretation.  Perhaps there is another juxtapositioning, that of Torah study and mezuza.  This brings in a separate reference that refers to women's absolute requirement to affix mezuzot, suggesting that women should be obliged to study Torah.  Similarly, the example of residing in a sukka is argued in both directions.  Perhaps a woman is not obligated because of the words "all the homeborn in Israel", which serves as an exclusion of women.  But maybe a woman is obligated to observe this mitzvah because men and women are commanded to reside together.

The Gemara discusses the obligation to assemble at  the Festivals and the obligation to rejoice.  One argument is particularly telling: women do not need to assemble to rejoice at Festivals because their husbands should cause them to rejoice, instead.  The rabbis consider the case of a widow, too.

The remainder of our daf questions whether or not two verses that come as one (through these juxtapositions) create a precedent.  As they confirm that this is not the case, the rabbis note that there must be proofs teaching that women are actually obligated to perform mtizvot that are positive but not time-bound.  We will continue learning about how this works tomorrow.