Today they begin with a case where one provides payment in teruma to a kohen. The teruma is ritually impure. The rabbis consider intentionality: did he mean to give ritually impure (ie. forbidden) teruma to the priest? Or was it an accident? The rabbis are stringent in their rulings: the teruma must be replaced by ritually pure teruma. Torah law is more lenient. A kohen is even allowed to marry a woman using this ritually impure payment! And so, the rabbis argue, this is a case where rabbinical halacha uproots Torah halacha.
The Gemara presents a second case where blood that has been intentionally sprinkled on the altar is ritually impure. What should be done to amend for this transgression? Again, the rabbis consider whether or not intentionality is of importance. Does sprinkling blood on the breastplate of the High Priest offer acceptance? They walk us through the power of the breastplate according to Torah law. It can offer acceptance for transgressions concerning blood, meat, fat; unwitting, accidental and intentional sins; individual or community transgressions. And yet the Sages teach that the breastplate cannot offer acceptance for this case (but the offering cannot be eaten). Perhaps atonement, but not acceptance. This is because one is asked to shev v'al ta'aseh, to sit and refrain from action, rather than to complete the actions specified in the Torah.
Rav Chisda raises four questions that challenge the idea that 'sitting and doing nothing' continues to follow Torah law. He believes that the rabbis are uprooting Torah law with some of their interpretations. This must have been a particularly difficult argument, as the rabbis were attempting to establish their undisputed authority over Jewish law. They were in direct conflict with groups like the Kutim, who followed Torah law without the rabbinical methods of interpretation. Could Rabbi Chisda's comments have put him into conflict with his own colleagues?
The Gemara offers proofs to address Rabbi Chisda's arguments. The proofs address issues including temporary halachot and whether or not a get, divorce contract, offered by a rabbinical court has any meaning since the Torah stipulates exactly when a get should be issued. The most difficult proof, in my eyes, is the proof that demands we build fences around Torah law. We safeguard the Torah.
The two examples that follow demonstrate instances where Torah law is followed but people are punished because sh'hasha'ah tzricha, the hour required it. Our notes teach us that this is thought of as amputating a limb to save the body. The first example is of the punishment of a man who rode a horse on Shabbat. The second is of a man who cohabited with his wife in full view. In both cases, the rabbis administered physical punishment to deter others in the community from participating in these actions.
This tradition is alive and well in the larger Jewish community. One of the reasons that my husband does not wear a kippa is that he does not comply with Jewish dietary laws. He does not want to give the impression that his behaviour is "Jewish" behaviour when he eats non-kosher meat, for example. And so he does not wear a kippa at work or on the street. Is this version of Judaism healthy for our religion, because it 'keeps the body alive'? Or are we preserving a 'body' that is not, in fact, representative of 'authentic' Judaism?
I know that I am very deeply Jewish in just about every sense even though I am not compliant with orthodox halacha. At the same time, I still have within me that idea that the orthodox have some sort of monopoly on proper Jewish practice.
We end today's daf with quick explanations of our Mishna. The comments teach us that
- men are allowed to defile themselves for their FIT wives;
- sometimes the rabbis encourage men to dislike their wives or nullify her vows to encourage him to divorce her;
- a wife's wages are her own unless she has no rights to her husband's food, for example, and thus she must be allowed to pay for her sustenance
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment