Yevamot II 117: On Dead Husbands and Women as Witnesses

A new Mishna offers some clarity regarding the issues discussed for some time.  We learn from this Mishna and the beginning of the Gemara that a woman who testifies that her husband has died is credible.  In ordinary circumstances, she receives only the value stated in her ketubah.  He statement does not affect inheritance until her husband is confirmed dead.  If she enters into yibum with her brother-in-law, however, he is able to inherit from his brother.  

Rav Chisda is concerned that if we interpret marriage contracts according to midrash, homiletically, then what stops us from interpreting the entire Torah according to midrash?

Rabbi Nachman asks what the court should do if a woman comes to the court and asks to remarry for her husband has died.  She is believed and she is given her marriage contract. But if the woman is obviously motivated by the money that she will receive through her ketubah: if she asks for the ketubah and then for permission to remarry, or simply for the ketubah, then she is not provided with that document.  I am not clear why a woman should not want to have her ketubah, for she may need that money to survive after her husband has disappeared/died.

A new Mishna teaches us that a woman can testify regarding her husband's death, and any other woman is believed with similar testimony, except for five women.  These are the widow's mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, the wife of her yavam, or the daughter of her yavam.  The Mishna notes that there is a difference between a ketubah and a death certificate, in that a ketubah provides written proof of the testimony of others while a statement of death might have been completed by the woman herself.

Any of these five women might hate the widow and would have reason to lie: they would like her to leave the family.  Other reasons for this type of hatred between women are described.  The Gemara mentions that the widow eats the family's food and she might be resented for that.  For the most part, though, women are said to hate other women because one woman likely will speak about another woman to a man - a husband or father or father-in-law - who will use that information against them.  The rabbis cite Proverbs 27:19, "As in water face answers to face, so the heart of man to man" to explain that when hatred builds in one person, it will also build in the person who is hated.*  The rabbis tell us that women have many reasons to lie about family relationships and they should not be trusted.

It is disheartening to read about the rabbis' concerns about women hating other women in their families.  But feminist theory speaks about this same dynamic: when men have power over women, women turn any hatred that we might feel toward that system not against men but against other women.  This is because we too have internalized the workings of this patriarchal system.  We too see the men as more deserving of the power that they yield.  Thus we direct our bad feelings at other women, for we will win the favour of those in charge; we will ensure our own survival.

Another Mishna asks what should be done when a woman says her husband has died and then she remarries.  If another witness claims that her husband is in fact alive, she need not divorce her current husband.  If two witnesses say that he is alive, then she is forced to divorce her new husband.  If this happens before she is married, the rabbis follow the principle regarding witnesses: one witness stands on its own merit if two witnesses are unavailable.  But if there are two witnesses, their opinion holds sway.   A note tells us that the people say that a widow with a missing husband should not remarry just because of the rumours that would spread about her.  The note tells us that this is considered to be 'good advice' rather than halacha.

The rabbis seem to be balancing a number of principles:

• the value of a man's testimony is at least twice (if not one hundred times) the weight of a woman's testimony
• in cases with groups of witnesses, the majority rules
• two witnesses negate the testimony of one witness, etc.

The Gemara points out that following majority rule would not necessarily create a stringency; in some cases it would create a leniency.

At the very end of today's daf, we begin a new Mishna regarding rival wives. If one says that her husband died and the other says that he is alive, the one who believes he is dead may remarry and may take the money promised in her ketubah.  The other may not marry and may not take of her contract.  If one wife says that he died and the other says he is killed, there are different opinions.  Rabbi Meir says that since they disagree, neither can remarry.  Rabbis Yehuda and Shimon disagree: both agree that he is dead, so both may remarry and take the money promised in their ketubot.  Finally the Mishna teaches that if single witnesses - men or women - disagree about whether another woman's husband has died, then the woman cannot remarry.

*A note reminds us that the rabbis generally interpret this proof regarding Torah study: study begets more study.