Yevamot II 104: Chalitza and a New Principle

Chalitza requires three actions: the yevama removing the yavam's shoe, the yevama spitting in front of the yavam, and the the yevama stating that she is performing chalitza.  The yavam's shoe must be made for walking, as the song says.  Chalitza should be performed on the right foot and during the day.  But some rabbis argue about whether or not chalitza would be valid after the fact if performed on the left foot and/or at night.  

The left foot question brings the rabbis to question whether halachot of chalitza might be analogous to the halachot of leprosy or monetary disputes.  In some situations, such as putting on tefillin, left-handed people don tefillin on their left sides.  In other situations, such as leprosy or a slave who chooses to remain in servitude, the right side of the body/the right ear is used for ritual purposes.  The rabbis discuss whether or not verbal analogies are valid.  For example, does "foot" in one context connote "foot" in another context?  Are the surrounding details similar enough to apply the interpretation of one verse to that of the other?

The rabbis share their difficulties with rabbis who choose to follow their own opinions and/or the opinions of unattributed opinions or dissenting opinions rather than the rabbinic majority.  For example, one rabbi witnessed chalitza at night, on his own - without two other witnesses who were not related to the yevam/a, using a slipper instead of a shoe.  Was he following individual opinions?  Aren't unattributed opinions considered to be majority opinions? 

A new Mishna wonders when chalitza is valid: are all three actions - spitting, speaking, and removing the shoe - required together to validate chalitza?  The Mishna lists a number of halachot regarding chalitza, including the disqualification of a deaf-mute, the invalidity of an adult woman and a minor boy, the requirement to repeat the chalitza of a minor girl and adult man, the requirement of two/three judges who are not relatives of the couple, and whether or not a chalitza done in prison with no witnesses is valid.

Rabbi Zeira introduces a principle that informs the rabbis' questions regarding the rituals of chalitza.  He asserts that whatever is fitting to be mixed, mixing is not indispensable to it.  And whatever is not fit to be mixed, mixing is indispensable for it.  This means that as long as it is possible to perform an action, that action does not have to be completed.  But if it is impossible to perform an action, such as a person who is a deaf-mute and is not capable of reciting the verses of chalitza, then the that action is in fact required.  

The daf ends with our rabbis continuing to consider whether chalitza is valid if one of its rituals is completed only partially.

I find the principle of mixing as introduced by Rabbi Zeira quite interesting.  Something is only necessary if we can't manage it. If we're able to do it, we don't need to.  This principle could lead us to believe that we do not need to 'prove' ourselves through ritual.  But we must be able to do those things.  In the context of different abilities, this principle is extremely exclusive and alienating.  But we can choose to use this concept toward bettering our functioning  in ritual and in life.  We should not focus on the ritual itself, but on knowing how to perform that ritual.  The focus is on learning rather than performance.