Yevamot II 121: Dead in the Water

As we begin today's daf, the rabbis consider how drowning and remaining in a body of water for three-five days might change the face.  They determine that unless there is a would that causes the deceased to swell, the person should be identifiable.  

A new Mishna teaches us that if one falls into a body of water and he is not found, his wife is prohibited from marrying.  Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei share cases where a person (or a part of a person) emerges from water after three days.  The Gemara focuses on whether or not a body of water has an end or not.  If we can see all possible exits from the water, a man missing in the water is considered dead after three days and his wife can remarry.  However, if there is any escape from the water that cannot be seen - a distant shore, for example, the man is presumed missing and his wife cannot remarry.

The rabbis share a number of case examples.  Two of these are similar: Rabban Gamliel witnesses Akiva and Rabbi Akiva witnesses Rabbi Meir fall from boats and presumably drown.  However, each is approached by the missing rabbi when they are ashore.  Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva ask how this could be.  The responses are that they were saved by carefully avoiding the immediate risks at sea (waves, etc.).

This allows the rabbis to again consider the horrific, gruesome situations.  Can we assume that a man is dead if he falls into a lion's pit?  A pit of scorpions or snakes?  What about a boiling cauldron of wine or oil?  If we allow his 'widow' to remarry without knowing with certainty that he is dead, we lead her to transgress. 

Today our Sages do not stay focused on these tragedies.  They move on to discuss miracles: we learn that general halachot are not to be based upon miraculous happenings.  A story is told of Nechunya the well-digger's daughter who fell into the Great Cistern.  Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa instructed him to pray.  He provided updates on her wellbeing each hour, saying that she ascended from the cistern after the third hour of prayer.  Rabbi Chanina denied being a prophet, however.  he reasoned that Nechunya's work was so critical, and done with such care, that G-d could not punish his daughter using the fruits of that labour.

How can he explain the drowning death of Nechunya's son, in that case?  The rabbis discuss the notion that those who are righteous are judged more harshly than others.  Minor infractions are punished as if they were major sins.  Those who are righteous should be scared of G-d's wrath, and they must be reminded of G-d's anger periodically.

How could the rabbis cope with their own personal tragedies while devoting their lives to G-d's approval?  How did they explain to themselves the randomness of suffering and loss?  In our modern times, people like me - those who believe in G-d as an source energy that has nothing vested in my personal life; something that exists independent of any of our desires, etc. - explain this more easily.  G-d does not grant us our wishes, we say.  It is not the nature of G-d to create or solve our problems.  But our Sages did not have the luxury of releasing themselves from their understandings of G-d.   They rationalized their own suffering with the same systematic reasoning that they used to understand  all of G-d's "will".

One last Mishna ends our daf.  We are told that women and children reporting that someone has died can be believed in certain circumstances.  The Gemara discusses the words of a Gentile: can he be believed if he is not permitted to testify?  The rabbis consider the motivations of different witnesses.  Are they simply speaking about what they have heard, or did they actually witness the deceased person?  Were they intending to affect the 'widow's' marital status, or were they simply sharing news?  Were the children just back from hearing eulogies about the deceased person?  Did a woman tell the Gentile that someone had died, and now he is repeating it as testimony?

Some of these rulings are more lenient that past rulings.  And others are stringent, where women are not permitted to remarry, but the rabbis state that she is not obligated to divorce her new husband.  It is such a privilege to read of the rabbis' actual cases, their decision-making, and their creation of halachot given the realities that they face.