Ketubot 22: When is a Woman Credible?

While today's daf digs deep into the halachot regarding witnesses, the depth was overshadowed by the topic at hand.  After finishing their conversation regarding judges where something goes awry, the rabbis focus on a new Mishna on when to trust a woman's word.  It teaches that if a woman says that she was married but now is divorced, she is deemed credible.  This is because the mouth that prohibited (by saying that she was married, she puts herself at a disadvantage) is the same mouth that permitted (by saying that she is a divorcee and now allowed to marry all but Kohanim).  But if one witness says only that she is married, the woman is not deemed credible. 

Similarly, if a woman claims that she was a captive but not raped, she is deemed credible because the mouth that prohibits (by admitting that she was a captive) is the same mouth that permits (by saying that she is 'pure' and thus of higher status; able to marry).  If witnesses say that she was in fact raped, then the woman is not deemed credible.  But if those witnesses speak up after this woman has married, the woman does not need to leave her husband.

Deuteronomy 22:16 is utilized to explain this slightly differently.  In that verse, a man is said to have married off his daughter to 'this' man.  By marrying her, the rabbis understand that she was prohibited from being with any other man.  By referring to 'this' man, the rabbis explain that she was permitted to that one man.  Thus the same mouth that prohibits is the mouth that forbids.

The Gemara begins in earnest with an innocent enough interpretation.  The rabbis say that a woman has been deemed credible because she offers a reason for her claim.  However, this is immediately countered.

Shmuel asks what to do if a woman claims that she is ritually impure (menstruating) and then that she is pure.  Does one statement have to immediately follow the next for her to be deemed credible? Although the rabbis rule leniently, and although Shmuel learned this passage forty times to be sure that he remembered it, he behaved stringently when this happened to him.

A woman might provide a rationale like, "I was too tired for intercourse and so I claimed to be menstruating".  Or a woman might explain that she did not sip from the cup of wine after the bracha because her sister-in-law across the table, in the state of niddah, and she did not wish to embarrass her sister-in-law by accentuating the fact that she was the only one not taking the wine.

The rabbis move on to a discussion of what to do if a woman claims that her husband has died and witnesses dispute her claim.  The Gemara goes in and out and around.  What about the requirement of two witnesses?  What about just one witness?  What about the credibility of the witnesses?  Would a woman actually lie to her husband's face?  Would she stop herself from lying if she had found witnesses to back her claim?  What about divorce - what if she did not have the get with her?  

What is difficult to muster is the fact that women had such little currency in the times of the Talmud.  They did not count as witnesses - and if they were allowed to speak for themselves, almost anyone else's claim would supercede her own.  If a woman knew that her husband had died - or if she knew that she was divorced, it was not enough to simply say so and move on with her life.  Without external proof, a woman's word was worth less than a thirteen year-old boy's..