Before introducing a new Mishna the rabbis continue their conversation. They consider what should be done if only one of the two witnesses admits to have conspired? The rabbis discuss where one might be able to divide the punishment/consequence, like in the case case of money owed, and when they might not, like in the case of lashes where each witness could receive the same number of lashes. What makes a witness liable to pay, the rabbis wonder. Is admission necessary? Is admission enough?
Our new Mishna teaches about what should be done if witnesses conspire to say that a man divorced his wife but did not give her her ketuba. Should they be liable to pay the sum of the ketuba after being discovered to be conspiring witnesses? They could argue that in the near or far future the husband could in fact divorce his wife and give her the sum of her ketuba. They did not conspire to have him pay a sum that he would not otherwise have had to pay. In this case, the Mishna teaches that the court would determine how much one would be willing to pay for this woman's ketuba while knowing that if she were divorced or widowed the purchaser would receive that payment but if she dies, her husband will inherit from her and the purchaser would receive nothing.
The Gemara wonders how the worth of the woman's ketuba should be decided. It would be worth less than if the husband inherited it, Rashi comments. Does the worth of her ketuba include her usufruct property, that which she brought with her into the marriage, or does it include only the value of the ketuba itself?
A second new Mishna comment on what to do when witnesses testify that one man owned another man 1000 dinars that were borrowed on the condition that he is to give the money back between now and thirty days which have passed.If the borrower says that the condition was that the money must be repaid between now and ten years from now and the witnesses were rendered conspiring witnesses, they cannot be liable to pay the entire 1000 dinars. Instead, the court estimates how much money one would be willing to give to keep a loan of 1000 dinars. It calculates the difference between that sum owed up to thirty days away and up to ten years away. That sum is what the conspiring witnesses must pay as punishment.
The Gemara asks how the shemita, the Sabbatical year, would play into a debt over ten years. At the end of year six, the loan would be forgiven. Should the debt be calculated differently? Commentary by Steinsaltz notes that Rashi added some insight: loans held with collateral are not subject to the shemita laws because the lender is owning property of the borrower. Rabbi Yehuda notes that when people make an agreement about the payment of a loan and the shemita laws override that agreement, the contract is void and the loan must be repaid without conditions at the shemita year.
We learn one Sage's teachings: when the contract states that one can borrow for an unspecified period of time, it is unreasonable to ask for the money to be repaid within thirty days. In fact, it is noted that borrowing for a shorter period of time than thirty days is usually done without a promissory note at all.
Rav Yehuda teaches that Rav said that one who tears or cuts a new opening in a garment's neck is liable to bring a sin offering. S/he transgressed the law of labour - 'hitting with a hammer' - or the primary law of tearing. Rav Kahana disagrees and says that this action is similar to the permitted action of removing a wine covering where one is using a utensil. His point is disputed: removing a wine covering is doing something meant to be done, while opening a neck hole is creating a connecting element as per the weave of the fabric.
Rav Yehuda quotes Rav again: when one sixty-fourth log of wine is dropped into a container of three log of drawn water, even if the water looks like wine, it does not invalidate a mikva less than 40 log of water. Rav Kahana disagrees again: the discolouration of the water being added creates "dye water", which is forbidden in a mikvah. This is countered as well: it is not called dye water, it is called diluted wine. Wine does not invalidate a mikva. This is argued as well, of course - doesn't a kortov, three log of water into which a small amount of wine has fallen, disqualify a mikva? Not so, it is argued. And this will be continued in tomorrow's daf.
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