Kiddushin 3: What We Know By Way of Omission

The rabbis continue their reasoning regarding the use of the word derachim, ways, and the word devarim, matters.  Why might the Mishna have taught that a woman is betrothed or acquired in three ways rather than through three matters?  They call on the examples of the etrog which is said to be like a tree in all ways and the koi which is said to be like a domesticated animal in a number of matters.  When do we use these different terms?

We learn that whenever the rabbis argue about different possible interpretations, they use derachim, ways, to describe the issue at hand.  When there is no argument and all agree about a specific point of interest, the word devarim, matters, is utilized.

Next, the rabbis consider why we are told that there are three or two ways that women can become betrothed or acquire themselves.   We know how to count to three.  But that number cannot be superfluous.  The rabbis decide that the number is stated to remind us that other forms of betrothal are excluded from this list.  What are those?  Symbolic exchange?  This suggestion does not hold up to scrutiny.  Exchange for an item that is worth less than a peruta?  Perhaps.  The ritual of chalitza for a married woman?  Yes – because a woman requires a scroll or a book or a document to release her from marriage.  Chalitza does not require this physical documentation.

In amud (b), we are reminded that this Mishna taught us that women can be acquired through the exchange of money.  How is this the case?  Perhaps the father takes money from the husband.  This is compared, again, to the process of manumission.  A maidservant can be freed without money (Exodus 21:11).  But, the rabbis argue, that means that she leaves her current master without money but her new master is given money.  And that new master is her father. 

But how could a young woman who has been betrothed go back to her father?  How could he take ownership of her money?  The rabbis suggest that we must be speaking of a young girl – and then they state a principle: We do not derive monetary matters from ritual matters.  These halachot are actually taken from those regarding the nullification of vows, says Rav Huna.  A father does not have the right to take his daughter’s money for betrothal.  This is similar to another principle:  We do not derive monetary matters from fines.  That is, we do not use the halachot of fines to inform other monetary matters.* 

The rabbis also teach us that payment to the released girl’s father are not justified by the fact that fathers are paid for humiliation and degradation when their daughters are raped.  This is because fathers could humiliate their own daughters in other ways, like betrothing them to men with boils, which would lessen their value.  The fines are not required.

Our daf concludes as the rabbis return to their first argument: Money is paid to a girl’s father due to the verse in Exodus that tells us that maidservants are freed without money.  Again, we learn about what this verse excludes: who IS given money upon this occasion of manumission?  Could it be two people simultaneously?  And wouldn’t one of those two be her father?

Today’s daf feels ancient in every way.  The manner in which verses are interpreted – what is NOT being said? – the flippant understanding of forms of slavery and theft, the total vulnerability that defined the lives of girls and women.  A disturbing beginning to Masechet Kiddushin. 

* A note in Steinsaltz teaches that fines are paid to the injured party rather than to the court.  Fines are intended to discourage certain behaviours but they are not meant to punish.  Interestingly, each fine is considered to be a novel law.  We do not derive halachot from novel cases.