Ketubot 43: Monetary Support for Women Without Husbands/Fathers; Women’s Rights to That Support

The rabbis remind us that one should not be allowed to deny the charge of rape so that he is excused from the fine for that crime -- and then admit to the same crime so that he is subject to the punishments for humiliation and degradation.  Humiliation and degradation are dependent on the crime of rape happening first.

From this point, the rabbis examine how widows, orphans and daughters are provided for when the family’s male provider dies.  Heirs are obligated to provide for widows, and thus women are dependent on their children to care for them after their husbands have died.  Heirs are also obligated to care for their sisters before themselves.  Thus if a father leaves his fortune to his sons, the sons must provide for the daughters even if it means that they go door to door to beg for their own sustenance.  

But what does it mean to “sustain” the women in one’s family?  The rabbis debate about whether sons are required to support their mothers or their sisters ‘first’.  And to what degree of comfort do these sons provide sustenance?  Don’t the earnings of those mothers and sisters go to the sons, anyway?  The rabbis look to how Canaanite slaves are provided for compared with other slaves.  All slaves must be fed in times of famine, but in times of plenty, Canaanite slaves are permitted to use their minimal salaries to find their own food.  How could the rabbis argue that daughters are treated more poorly than Canaanite slaves?  Thus the rabbis agree that daughters are permitted to keep their earnings and their found possessions rather than give them to their brothers.

Extending this argument, the rabbis look to Leviticus 25:46, “And you may make them an inheritance for your sons after you”.  This is interpreted to mean that slaves can be transferred from father to son in inheritance, but daughters cannot.  Rabba disagrees.  The rabbis consider the differences between rights to a woman’s money and rights pertaining to her body.  It should be permitted to transfer earnings, suggests Rava, which is different from transferring unpaid fines or other monetary obligations.

Amud (b) begins with one further consideration.  Perhaps the case in question involves a woman whose face was injured in the rape or seduction.  This might lower her ‘value’, and it is her father’s right to sell his daughter as a maidservant, and thus a fine for degradation should be paid to her father.  Or perhaps the injury to her face causes the victim’s family to suffer humiliation.  Or, if her livelihood is affected by this injury, perhaps she should be paid the monetary penalty directly and not through her father.

Amud (b) continues with a new Mishna.  It discusses who receives the ketubah money if a father marries off his daughter and she is divorced, and then he marries her off again and she is widowed.  Does the ketubah from both marriages belong to her father?  Or does she retain rights t the second ketubah?

When is a woman permitted to put a lien on her husband’s property to demand payment?  The rabbis wonder what should be done in unusual situations.  For example, if a woman is owed her ketubah from her husband but he dies before paying her, she can take out a lien on his property. 

I am imagining some very strong women who were able to stand up to a large, patriarchal system and demand their what is rightfully theirs.  The stereotype of the loud, demanding Jewish woman might have originated in these traditions!