Shevuot 30: Guidelines for Judges and Witnesses at Court

Today's daf begins Perek III.  Our first new Mishna teaches about oaths regarding testimony.  In opposition to yesterday's Mishna regarding oaths of utterances.  Oaths of testimony require a number of different conditions:

• men can testify but women cannot testify
• strangers can testify but relatives cannot;
• oaths are liable both in or outside of the beit din 
• if an oath is imposed on someone, he is liable only if he denies the claim in the beit din
• Kosher witnesses are liable but invalid witnesses are not valid
• one is liable for oaths in vain if he really remembers the testimony
• when liable, one brings an offering

The Gemara begins by questioning the source of our knowledge that the oath does not apply to women.  A number of verses seem to suggest that the halacha regarding women as invalid witnesses provides adequate proof.  The conversation turns to witnesses in general.  Are we certain that verses are referring to witnesses?  How do we know to separate the experience and testimony of one witness from that of another?  Are women permitted to come to the bet din to participate?  Wouldn't they send their husbands?

The rabbis teach us about how parties can be judged equally in the beit din.  From a baraita we learn that both parties must stand, but rabbis know that judges may decide that they should sit.  What if one person stands and the other sits?  The judge cannot force this to happen, nor can he permit only one party to speak for as long as s/he wants.  Perhaps a verse teaches that one should judge one's fellow favourably; one should assume that all others keep halacha if one sees another person doing something that could be questionable.  Further, one who keeps the mitzvot should always be judged favourably.  

We learn that Rav Huna's widow was judged by Rav Nachman.  He thought about what he should do:

• if he stands to honour her, her opponent might be surprised and thus compromised in pleading his case
• he cannot sit while she stands because the wife of a talmud scholar deserves the respect of a talmud scholar
• he could tell his servant to make a goose flutter on him so that it would seem that he stood up because of the goose
• and what about the final verdict, where the judge must sit and the parties must stand?

We learn that he sat half-way, like one who is untying his shoe, while saying that one was liable and the other exempt.

In a similar case, we learn that an ignoramus and a talmud scholar must both sit if they have a case with each other.  If the ignoramus wishes to stand, he is not countered.  Another interesting case tells of a judge who asks first an ignoramus and then Reuven, a sage, to sit.  An officer of the beit din kicked Reuven, suggesting that Reuven stand.  Reuven did not do so.  We are told that Reuven would understand that it was the officer of the court and not the judge who was upset with him.  Other similar cases are shared to help us understand how judges should deliberate and carry out their duties.

A final baraita teaches us about separating ourselves from falsehoods:

• if a judge believes that he made a mistake, he may not defend his ruling
• a judge may not deliberate about the case with an unlearned student because this could lead the judge to err
• a judge may not sit on a beit din with a judge whom he knows is a thief
• a witness may not give testimony with a witness whom he knows is a thief, even if the testimony is true
• if a judge knows that one is testifying inaccurately, he may not rule based on it