Some of the points that we learn from these arguments:
- one could be obligated to fulfill one's promise based on the first hermeneutic principal of Torah study, kal v'chomer, simple and complex, also known as the principal of a fortiori, or 'all the more so'
- If one is liable to bring an offering based on reishut, voluntary acts unrelated to performing mitzvot, all the more should one be liable regarding keeping a mitzvah which was obligated to us on Sinai
- If this is a case of 'lehara o leheitiv", choosing evil or choosing good, it cannot be applied to the fulfilment of a mitzvah
- examples include one who swears to hurt oneself and does not keep one's oath; one who swears to hurt others and does not keep one's oath
- in both examples one is exempt because the oath was made in vain
- if one swears twice, for example "I swear I will not eat this loaf; I swear I will not eat it", one is only liable once if one transgresses
- cases might be discussing reishut or mitzvot
- the example of a person taking an oath of nazirut twice is contrasted
Of note are the rabbis' primary interests:
- is the action positive or negative?
- is the action voluntary or does it regard a mitzvah (an obligation)?
- in which order were the person's oath spoken?
- which principles might be applied to any statement in order to elucidate its meaning?
- what was the person's intent?
Clearly the rabbis wished to ensure that future judges would undergo their considerations with tremendous seriousness.
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