- "I will give/not give something to x (another person)"
- "I gave/did not give something to x"
- "I will/will not sleep"
- "I slept/did not sleep"
- "I will/will not throw a rock into the sea"
- "I threw/did not throw a rock into the sea"
Rabbi Yishmael says that an offering is only required for oaths regarding the future. Rabbi Akiva says that if that is the case one should be liable only for doing good or evil, not for doing something neutral like throwing a rock into the sea. He claims that the Torah includes oaths about the past as well as the future.
The Gemara considers the stringency of different types of oaths. Nedarim take effect on mitzvot and optional matters when shevuot do not. However, shevuot take effect regarding intangible and tangible thing when nedarim do not.
Why would a person swear that s/he will give or not give to another? Perhaps this refers to tzedaka, the mitzvah of charitable giving. Or perhaps this refers to giving a gift to a rich person.
What does "I will not sleep" refer to? Rabbi yochanan notes that if one swears "I will not sleep for three days", we lash him for this impossible oath and he can sleep immediately! Perhaps what was meant was "I will not sleep until I must sleep".
What is meant by "I will/not throw a rock into the sea"? Is this regarding witnessing someone else throwing into the sea? Because it applies in the positive and the negative, is this a shevua bitui? Shmuel reminds us that it is an oath regarding the future and so it is meaningful. The rabbis argue about whether or not oaths are valid when they are about the past and/or the future.
If a person swears not to fulfill a mitzvah and then s/he fulfils it, he is exempt. If he swore to fulfil a mitzvah and did not fulfils it, he is also exempt. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beteira says that if one is liable for transgressing an oath that is about something optional when not forced to do it because of the oath of Sinai, he must fulfil a mitzvah due to the oath at Sinai. The Sages disagree. They believe that he is liable for an oath about something optional because that oath could be made in the positive or the negative. The rabbis argue these points. They note that it is only through expounding that we learn about worthless oaths in the past.
A person could lie about an oath. For example, one could say "I did not eat" when he ate, and one could mean "I did not put on tefillin" when one said "I will not don tefillin". The liabilities would be different for the different oaths. S/he could be liable to bring an offering for swearing falsely without knowing he had transgressed. Regarding donning tefillin, he would be lashed if he had been warned not to swear falsely and he did anyway.
We learn that a shevuat shav is swearing to negate what people know to be true, for example that a stone pillar is made of gold. The rabbis argue that if people know about this false oath, it is worthless even though it is not regarding the future. However, if people do not know that this is a false oath, he is not liable for bitui.
Abbey teaches that Rav admits that a person is exempt for swearing falsely because the negative version of the statement is worthless, but because this is a shevua ha'edut, an oath about witnesses. Might a person have to bring more than one offering for multiple transgressions? The rabbis share examples of people using improper witnesses.
The notion of "lying" is fascinating in the times of the Torah. Just like now, many people could not be trusted to tell the truth. Back then, though, the wrath of G-d was a successful intimidation tactic. Today there is such a thing as atheism; in the time of the Talmud we are led to believe that people took for granted the existence of G-d - or, at the very least, multiple idols. Clearly there were always people who did not believe that G-d would punish them harshly for their 'transgressions'.
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