Sanhedrin 86: Kidnapping, Sale, Sages Who Rebel Against the Sanhedrin

Speaking further about kidnapping, the rabbis turn to arguing about the source of our last baraita.  They also discuss who else might be excluded from suspicion of kidnapping, including one's rabbi, one's slave, one's half-slave.  

The Gemara considers which verse might be the one that forbids kidnapping.  Rabbi Yishmael's thirteen methods of expounding are referenced, for one of those methods is to learn from the context. Thus because the previous mitzvot forbid murder and adultery, kidnapping should be assumed to be forbidden as well.  

A case is introduced by Chizkiya and answered by Rabbi Yochanan.  What should be done if two witnesses testify that a person was kidnapped and two other testify that he was sold?  Rabbi Yochanan suggests that those who are huzmu, a first set of conspiring witnesses proven to have been with a third set of witnesses, should be killed.  But is a half-testimony enough?  And what a about kidnapping without actually selling the victims - is this the same crime as kidnapping and selling?

The rabbis consider communication between those who have been kidnapped communication between witnesses, communication between slaves and their owners.  While the power dynamics within these relationships are not detailed in our text, they are implied.  These are the same dynamics that we discuss in today's deliberations regarding consent and capacity.  Who receives which messages from which other person - and how does that psychologically-based information help us understand a conflict and its solution? 

We end our daf with a new Mishna:  A zaken mamrei is one who rebels against the Great Sanhedrin.  One sits at the entrance in the Temple wall, one at the entrance to the Chamber of the Great Sanhedrin, and one at the entrance to the Azarah.  When a Sage opposed his city's beit din, they go to the Sanhedrin at the entrance in the Temple wall.  They say, "this is how I expounded and this is how he expounded.  This is how I learned and this is how they learned".  If the Sanhedrin can solve the question with a tradition that they know applying to this halacha, they do so.  Otherwise they approach the Sanhedrin at the entrance to the Azarah.  If they have no tradition, they all go to the Great Sanhedrin in the Chamber.  If the Sage returns to his city and continues learning as he did before, he is exempt.  If he rules for others to follow in his practice, he is liable.  Thus he is only liable if he teaches others to follow his interpretation.

If a student - one who is not qualified to rule - rules for others to follow, he is exempt.  His disqualification as a leader exempts him from punishment.  

These teachings are helpful for those of us who might have arguments with the rulings of our Sages.  While we have no Temple to approach; no Sanhedrin to which we can appeal for a ruling, we are permitted to ask.  We are even permitted to learn and practice differently from the Sanhedrin, but we must not teach others to practice as we do.  For me, this suggests that if enough people take issue with a halacha and work toward creating a meaningful, text-base change, we might even change our tradition.  The requirement to "not teach" ensures that societal change is very, very slow.  Still, each person (well, each Sage) has the opportunity to think for him or herself.