Sanhedrin 79: Intentionality, Monetary Consequences, Murderers All of Them

Today's daf includes two Mishnayot and some relatively straightforward ideas.  I'll attempt to share all of these.

Our new Mishna teaches about liability when murder is intended for a person other than the one who is killed.  Case examples of liability include when:

• one intends to kill an animal and kills a person
• one intends to kill a Gentile and kills a Jew
• one intends to kill a non-viable baby and kills a viable baby
• one intends to hit someone on the leg which would not have killed him but hits someone on the chest with the same force and kills him
• on intends to kill someone with a blow to the leg but he would not have been killed; instead he hits this person on the chest which does kill him
• one intends to hit an adult but accidentally kills a minor
• one who intended to hit a minor but hit an adult where the adult died for another reason

One is exempt from the death penalty when:

• he intended to kill an adult but hit a minor with the same force, killing the minor, and
• he intended to kill someone by a blow to the loins but the same blow to the heart was fatal

The rabbis discuss these cases as proof that intention is critical important when determining the liability of the aggressor.  

The Gemara turns to cases where monetary restitution is the appropriate consequence.  The case of a pregnant woman who loses her baby due to two men fighting near her and accidentally throwing her down.  The potential life lost cannot be replaced, and so the baby's father puts forward a price for the loss of that child, which is paid by the aggressor.  Further, the famous Exodus phrase, an eye for an eye, is discussed here.  The rabbis note that we do not take a physical eye for the loss of another eye.  Instead we take payment for the loss of that eye.

Before looking at a second Mishna, we learn that animals that are killed, accidentally or not, are consequenced monetarily.  Sometimes this is exempted, and we learn that the discussion takes place because the death penalty would have erased the possibility of a second, more lenient consequence.  

Our second Mishna teaches that when a murderer is next to a group of people and we cannot determine which person he is, then the entire group is held in a cell until they die.   Do we prefer to agree that all of these people are potentially murderers? Or that all of these people are potentially exempt?