Sanhedrin 77: Intentionality and Consequences

Continuing their very morbid and disturbing conversations regarding which method of punishment or execution should be used for which transgressions, the rabbis turn their attentions to the crime of leaving a person, not 'just' an animal, to die.  Rava suggests that if one ties up another and that person starves to death, the first person is exempt from liability.  Hunger came on of it own volition.  However, if he restrained that person who died from sun or cold exposure, he is liable.  This is because he would have known that the temperature would become deadly.

Rava continues: if one tied up another in front of a lion, he is exempt because he could not have escaped anyway.  Tosofot comment that if one had time to tie up the other, then the lion was held back and he might have been able to escape.  And then the rabbis discuss mosquitoes.  If he was tied up and then killed by a swarm of mosquitoes, Rava say that the person tying is liable.  Rav Ashi disagrees: maybe the original mosquitoes flew away and he was killed by other mosquitoes.  

What about one who ties a person under a barrel and he dies of suffocation, or one who uncovered the roof over him, allowing the cold in to freeze him to death?  He should be exempt, say the rabbis.  He must be exempt based on Rava's accepted argument that if one tied up another and he starved to death, that he is exempt.  Rabbi Zeira had taught that if Levi locked Yehuda in a marble house and lit a fire, killing Yehuda with the heat, that Levi is liable.  This is because Levi was the one to light the fire.

Does it matter that the lack of air was present already when a barrel was tied over a person's head?  Pushing someone into a pit and then removing his ladder, leaving him to die, is not so serious.  Why? Because when he pushed him in, it was still possible to leave the pit.  Removing the ladder was done at a later time.  Similarly, if a person is holding medicine that will heal the shot of an arrow and he is then shot, the shooter is not liable.  In a case where the person who was shot had an opportunity to heal himself but did not, the shooter is permanently exempted.

The rabbis discuss indirect actions that kill.  If a person threw a rock at a wall and when it bounced back it killed someone, Rava says that he is liable.  To support this, we learn about one who bounces a ball off of a wall which then hits and kills someone.  If that person was b'mezid, attempting to purposely kill someone, then he is executed.  If that person was b'shogeg, accidentally killing that person, he is punished with excommunication from the community.  The rabbis question whether or not it is possible to warn someone of the risk of death when they are simply playing with a ball against a wall.  Perhaps it should depend on how far the victim is from the wall.  Perhaps we should simply allow people to bounce balls, which is a natural impulse.

Our daf ends with a number of examples of accidental actions that might end in the death of someone else.