The rabbis wonder whether we can learn anything applicable
from the halachot regarding the rending of garments upon learning that one is
in mourning. One might rend his garment
upon learning that a close relative died.
Different halachot apply if one learns that it was his father but he
thought his son had died; if one learns that it was his son but he thought his
father had died. So we know that
specificity matters.
Timing matters as well. For example, if a person rends his garment immediately after learning that his father died and then, within the time it takes to speak a three-word sentence, he learns that it was his son who died, he need not rend his clothing again. Another example involves a similar situation. If a person saw someone faint – fall into a coma, perhaps – and believed that victim had died, he might rend his clothing immediately. If the person in fact died very shortly after that moment of rending one’s clothing, the clothing need not be torn again.
Timing matters as well. For example, if a person rends his garment immediately after learning that his father died and then, within the time it takes to speak a three-word sentence, he learns that it was his son who died, he need not rend his clothing again. Another example involves a similar situation. If a person saw someone faint – fall into a coma, perhaps – and believed that victim had died, he might rend his clothing immediately. If the person in fact died very shortly after that moment of rending one’s clothing, the clothing need not be torn again.
We learn that a short pause is considered to be like dibur damei, continuous speech. Continuous speech allows us to immediately
retract what we have just said – whether that is a vow, an insult, a promise –
whatever. Except for four things: blasphemy or idol worship – which are both
punished by death by stoning – and betrothal or divorce – which are both
impossible to retract without paying out the ketuba.
A new Mishna teaches us two separate rules. First, if a woman says that grapes and figs
are konam for her and her husband only ratifies one of those fruits, the entire
vow is ratified. If he only nullifies
one of those fruits, his nullification is void unless he includes both
fruits. Thus nullification of a vow must
be specific to each part of that vow.
However, the second part of this Mishna says that if a woman says that
tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, each fruit is a separate
vow requiring individual nullification.
The rabbis argue about the importance of using the word
‘tasting’ twice verses using the word
‘konam’ twice.
We learn a new Mishna at the end of amud (b). A man might say that he has learned that his
wife or daughter has made vows but he does not know whether or not he can
nullify them because they might not require nullification, because he does not
know how to nullify them, or because he believes it is too late to nullify
them. Rabbi Meir says that he cannnot
nullify these vow. The rabbis disagree
and say that he can nullify these vows on the day that he understand that they
can nullify them.
The Gemara notes that in Numbers (25:33), we learn that a
person who is blind is excused from punishment for killing someone
accidentally. Rabbi Yehuda teaches this
based on the words “not seeing” in that verse.
Rabbi Meir disagrees, saying that a blind person is not different from
anyone else, and if he kills someone accidentally, he too should be
exiled.
The Gemara uses this to prove that Rabbi Meir does not
distinguish between different types of lack of knowledge.
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