Ketubot 94: Oaths, Judge's Discretion, Repossession

The Gemara for our last Mishna begins today's daf.  The Mishna speaks of a husband who marries four wives and then dies, leaving only 100 dinars to split among them according to past rules.  However, each wife, from the first to the fourth, must take an oath to the next wife that she has not taken anything from the estate inappropriately.  The fourth wife need not take an oath.  

The Gemara begins with a discussion of that fourth wife.  If a creditor returns and takes the land of the third wife, the fourth wife should relinquish some of her land in its place.  Is the fourth wife going to care for her land well knowing that it might be taken from her?  Shouldn't she take an oath regarding this?  Ben Nanas disagrees, saying that she will take good care of the land.  Abaye the Elder, noting that people to take oaths regarding transactions with orphans, wins this debate: the fourth wife must also take an oath.

Perhaps wives are acting as agent for other wives when they take these oaths.  After all, the second wife does not take an oath to the fourth wife, but they may be bound by each other's inheritance. After considering this, the rabbis wonder about the differences between contracts that are effected simultaneously and contracts that are enacted sequentially.  If two people have been given a contract to acquire the same lot of land, only the first person to receive that contract is the land's owner.  Do judges have discretion when they decide about such cases?  Should they?

A case involving Rami bar Chama and Mar Ukva bar Chama elucidates the rabbis' concerns.  Their mother gave Rami bar Chama a deed to her property in the morning.  She then gave the same deed to Mar Ukva bar Chama in the evening.  Each went to a different rabbi who did verify that indeed, each of them was entitled to the land.

Rav Sheshet says that he awarded Rami bar Chama the deed because he was given the deed first, and because he has a judge's discretion.  Rav Nachman argued that outside of Jerusalem, documents need not include the hour of their transaction, and thus both contracts were given at the same time/ on the same day.  Further, he used his discretion as a judge. And, in fact, Rav Sheshet is not truly a judge.

Another case was set before Rav Yosef.  Two men held deeds for the same plot of land.  One deed was dated the fifth of Nissan, and the other was simply dated "Nissan".  Rav Yosef awarded the property to the person who's deed specified a particular date.  The other claimant refuted this, saying "Should I lose?"  His deed could have been written earlier in Nissan.  Rav Yosef agreed, "You are at a disadvantage; one could say that your deed was written on the 29th of Nissan (and you would have no proof otherwise)".   

The claimant countered Rav Yosef, saying that he should be given authorization to repossess the property from the first month of Iyyar .  This would allow him to own the property from the first of Nissan.  The Gemara notes the remedy: both claimants should write documents of authorization to each other.  This will allow lined property to be repossessed.