The rabbis examine the requisite roasting of the Paschal lamb. We are commanded "... [not to] eat it partially roasted, nor boiled in any way in water, but roasted with fire; its head with its legs, and with the innards in it" (Exodus 12:9) The rabbis wonder about the role of water in the roasting process and outside of that process. What constitutes boiling, which is strictly prohibited? How does that compare with soaking or dipping in water or another liquid? Are we permitted to roast the Paschal lamb in a pot? Are we permitted to eat the Paschal lamb while it is still raw? What about if it has been roasted until it burns? And how does intention change the punishment met on a transgressor?
Rav Chisda mentions that people are permitted to cook food in the hot springs of Tiberias on Shabbat; however, the Paschal lamb cannot be boiled in this manner. Why are we allowed to cook using that natural source of heat on Shabbat? Steinsaltz explains that the heat of the springs originates in heat from the core of the earth rather than from fire. It is the lighting of fire that we are to avoid on Shabbat, and thus cooking in the hot springs is permitted.
The rabbis debate on how many sets of lashes people should receive if they transgress the mitzvah of "You shall eat it ... roasted with fire". If s/he eats the Paschal lamb when it is partially roasted and then boiled, s/he may receive three sets of lashes: one for eating it partially rather than fully roasted, one for eating it boiled, and one for NOT eating it fully roasted.
Likely Abaye argues against this ruling; he says that we should not punish the transgression of a prohibition that was stated in general terms. As well, we should not punish with lashes for boiling the lamb. Instead, we should punish with lashes only for not roasting it "with fire".
This example is contrasted with an example regarding a Nazirite who eats a grape - how many sets of lashes should s/he receive as punishment? The prohibition is "nothing that is made of the grapevine", and thus s/he could receive lashes for eating the grape skin, the grape pit, and something made of the grapevine (in general).
The rabbis use this opportunity to explain their process; to discuss the principles of halachic decision-making. The 'general versus specific' principal is highligted by the case of muzzling. In Deuteronomy, laws regarding lashes are juxtaposed with the halacha prohibiting muzzling: "You shall not muzzle an ox while it treads out the corn" (Deuteronomy 25:4). The rabbis understand this juxtapositioning as proof that we are to evaluate punishments given general and specific terms. In this example, we will receive lashes for breaking prohibitions that are similar to muzzling -- and we will not receive lashes for breaking prohibitions that are dissimilar to muzzling.
A note by Steinsaltz teaches that prohibitions stated in general terms come in three forms. The first is when one negative statement includes more than one prohibition. The second involves a particular prohibition and a general prohibition. The third refers to general prohibitions stated without details in the Torah; the Sages step in to provide the particulars.
We learn that a person who eats from a Paschal lamb belongs to a 'group', and may or may not be allowed to eat from the Paschal lamb of another 'group'. What are these groups, I wonder, and who determines their composition? Who monitors membership? Are these family clans or groups of men or something else entirely... and why have I never heard of this before??
The rabbis spend some time attempting to understand why the text uses the term "bashel mevushal", when both words signify the act of 'boiling'.
At the very end of today's daf, the rabbis wonder about when the Paschal lamb must be eaten. Exodus 12:8 tells us "And they shall eat the meat on that night, roasted with fire, and matzot; and with bitter herbs they shall eat it." All agree that we should eat this at night. However, what if one transgresses this mitzvah and eats the Paschal lamb during the day? The rabbis teach another principle: when a prohibition comes from an inference based on a positive mitzvah, it is considered to be a transgression of a positive mitzvah (rather than having transgressed a prohibition, which involves different consequences).
This self-reflexive, post-modern and yet ancient text continues to amaze.
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