One of their arguments regards punishment. If one is punished for deriving benefit from one prohibited item, for example, we should assume that they should be punished for deriving benefit from another prohibited item. The rabbis use grammatical differences to justify - and dispute - this notion.
We are reminded of the halachot regarding diverse seeds or any seeds at all planted in a vineyard. Not only are all of the produce of this vineyard prohibited, we cannot derive benefit from any of this produce, either. The text seems to be saying one of two things: once the seed grows 1/200th of its size, or once the seed grows to 1/200th the size of the crop, it prohibits benefit from all of that crop.
The rabbis consider the case of an asheira, wood of a tree that may have been used for idolatry. That wood cannot be used in any way at all. The rabbis argue about when we might use otherwise forbidden objects. Is it alright to use the wood of an asheira for medical purposes if a life is in danger?
Furthering this argument, Eliezer quotes Deuteronomy 6:5: "(you should love the Lord your G-d with) all your heart,... soul,... might." "Your soul" refers to people who value their bodies more that their possessions. These people should know that they should sacrifice their bodies to G-d if required. "Your might" refers to those who value their property more than their bodies. These people should know that they should sacrifice their possessions if necessary to honour G-d's commandments. However, the rabbis note that "you shall live through them [the mitzvot]" Leviticus 18:5, meaning that we should live and not die for the sake of mitzvot. All of this to teach us about when we should derive benefit from prohibitions, whether those are trees our (sacred and not-to-be-otherwise-harmed) bodies, or our possessions.
The rabbis then choose to discuss other examples of this concept of 'deriving benefit' from prohibited items. They compare the rape of a betrothed young woman to a murder. Not in a satisfactory way (for me), however. Instead they debate about whether one should do everything in one's power to prevent certain halachot from being broken. So a woman should allow herself to be killed rather than allow the laws of sexual relations to be prohibited. And if asked to murder someone or be killed, we should allow ourselves to be killed as "(his) blood may be redder than (ours)". We are told that this refers to the idea that a person kept alive may be able to do many, many mitzvot. But we never know who will do those mitzvot - we should not assume that we will do more mitzvot than another person.
Finally the rabbis look at the laws of orla, fruit less than 3 years old, which are not to be eaten - or used in any other way, ie. deriving benefit from orla. A story of Ravina rubbing his daughter's feverish body with orla olives for medicinal purposes teaches that the unusual use of orla fruit is permitted. She was not dying, and so his actions were prohibited according to that line of reasoning. The rabbis are struggling with how to apply the concept of 'deriving benefit' from otherwise prohibited items.
The end of daf b is quite complex. Steinsaltz provides a very useful chart to help us understand the arguments of the rabbis. Suffice it to say that Abaye and Rava debate and then Rav Yehuda and Rav Shimon debate about a four-part argument. Each rabbi rules on whether the 'derived benefit' is prohibited or permitted depending on the following circumstances:
- it is possible to use another item;
- it is impossible to use another item;
- the defendant intends to derive benefit from the prohibited item;
- the defendant does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibited item.
Clear rulings are given by Abaye and Rava regarding two categories. If the defendant does not intend to use the prohibited item and it is impossible to use another item, they agree that the item is permitted. Likewise, if the defendant intends to use the prohibited item and it is possible to use another item in place of the prohibited item, it is prohibited. The other rulings are much more complicated.
Today's daf examines how we might derive benefit from things (including concepts) that are prohibited to us. It is clear that using things in unusual ways is met with leniency. However, even medical issues are deliberated with stringency when prohibitions regarding idolatry, forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed are at hand. When looking at the rape of a young woman - likely a very young teenager - the rabbis again speak without thought of the trauma induced by this experience. At times the internal logic of the Talmud is beautiful and comforting; at other times it is brutal and without compassion. Today's daf included all of these things.
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