Continuing their conversation about inheritance that is given as a 'gift', the rabbis discuss a case where people claim that they will consecrate gifted property. The Sages decided that any gift that cannot be consecrated to the Temple is not a gift at all.
The Sages also taught about Hillel the Elder's eighty students. Thirty of them were said to be worthy of the Divine Presence resting upon them - like Moshe. Thirty were sufficiently worthy so that the sun should stand still for them like it did for Joshua bin Nun. Twenty were in-between those two others levels. The very greatest student was said to be Jonatan ben Uzziel and the least of them was Rabban Yochanan ben Zaikai. The Sages list the prowess of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai in all areas of learning. If the least of Hillel's students was this great, how much more so was Yonatan bin Nun? The Sages say that when he was engaged in study, birds flying over his head would be incinerated.
We are introduced to a new Mishna which teaches that if a person claims that a man is his son for the purposes of inheritance, he is believed. He is not believed if he claims that a man is his brother. In such a case, the person takes his own portion, and the man he claims is his brother takes part of the speaker's portion for himself. If the "brother" dies, then his portion returns to the speaker. If property came into the "brother's" possession from a source other than the father, then all of the brothers inherit with that "brother".
The Gemara begins with a discussion of the credibility of one who claims that someone is his son. He is believed both regarding inheritance and regarding rendering his wife exempt from levirate marriage. This second point means that his wife need not marry her brother-in-law, for her husband did have a child. The Gemara wonders whether a man is deemed credible if he claims from his deathbed that he has brothers, meaning that his wife might become a chalutzah. If he claims that he has a son from his deathbed, then he is believed. This was taught in Masechet Kiddushin (64a). We also learn that a husband who claims that he divorced his wife is believed.
The rabbis delve deeper into a conversation about the claim of divorce. If a man can divorce his wife at any time, why would we not believe him when he claims that they have divorced? Is he attempting to make a claim retroactively in order to excuse her sexual transgression? How might this possibility open the option of making a claim regarding the future? The rabbis ask whether we divide his statement or not: do we assume he is divorced from that moment forward, since he could divorce her at any time in the future, even though his claim that he was divorced in the past is rejected? Or do we not divide the statement and say that he is claim is rejected because a claim concerning the past cannot be accepted?
This is compared with Rava's statement. Rava speaks of a person who states that someone engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife, thus he and another witness decide to kill him (to have him sentenced to death for adultery). He did not claim that they were going to kill his wife. In any case, a husband cannot bear witness against his wife. This means that the husband's testimony is divided. His testimony concerning the the adulterer is accepted but his testimony concerning his wife's part in the transgression is rejected.
The Gemara suggests that the statement is divided only because there are two bodies at stake. When only one body is being discussed, the statement would not be divided.
Today's daf offers some insight into the halachot regarding adultery. However, more interesting to me is the theoretical, legal discussion about contracting meaning through the division of statements.
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