The rabbis question how to determine the type of liability for a stolen item that has been changed since it was stolen. For example, if wood was stolen and then fashioned into a vessel, if wool was stolen and then dyed and/or knitted into a piece of clothing, or if a baby animal was stolen but it grew into a ram. The rabbis question whether the name of the stolen item has changed or whether its nature has changed. They question whether or not the item can be refashioned into the stolen item again.
They determine that an item that can be returned in its original state is "restored" - it is returned as is. It seems that a change in the stolen item signals acquisition by the thief. Payment for the item itself is not necessary, but the double payment and four or fivefold payment may be ordered at court for the theft of the item. If the item cannot be restored because it has been irreversibly altered, the item is paid for according to its value at the time of the theft. Double payment and four or fivefold payment may be added for the theft according to the judge's ruling.
The rabbis consider ye'ush, despair. If a person despairs for an item, it means that that person considers the item to be lost forever. Once a person experience this emotion and or this belief, the item is considered to be lost. If found, it could be acquired by anyone. However, the thief is liable to pay for the value of the item at the time that it was stolen without having to return it.
We learn that the rabbis instituted takanat hashavim, an ordinance for the penitent. Rather than having to restore all items stolen, thieves were able to pay for the value of the items that they stole. Although this may go against Torah law, the rabbis are said to have introduced takanat hashavim to encourage those who have stolen to repent for their actions. This is an example of 'harm reduction', where the rabbis implement halacha that reflects their version of 'the greater good'. Takanat hashavim may serve as an important reminder of how the rabbis used their power to create the society that they believed was G-d's vision. We might use this knowledge to better understand how to interpret laws concerning gay sex and other disturbing Torah-based laws.
The rabbis debate whether or not ye'ush makes sense. What if matzah was stolen but peach elapses by the time that the thief has been found? Why wouldn't the thief say that he will simply return the matzah? Why would the thief consider the matzah, now useless, to have been acquired? The rabbis consider the thief's opinion and the opinion of the person who despairs the loss of the matzah. They determine that if the victim does not want their item returned, as it is useless, then the robber should pay the value of the matzah even if he no longer wishes to acquire it.
Our daf ends with a conversation about whether or not items should be acquired or valued differently based on how they change after they have been stolen. Is it simply a change in name? Or is it a true and substantial change, like creating bedding from stolen wool? That bedding, among other items, can now impart ritual impurity. Wool, stolen in its pure form, cannot. Rabbi Yosef teaches that that significant change in action - particularly regarding imparting ritual impurity - suggests that the item has been acquired.
That ruling is question in the very last paragraph of our daf. What about a beam that is changed to a joist by one who stole it? We learned in Gittin (55a) that a person who steals a beam and builds it into a house must pay money rather than return the beam. How might this inform our current questions?
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