The Gemara discusses who can acquire whom: can a Gentile acquire a Gentile slave? A Jewish slave? What about a slave who has been captured and then freed? The Gemara teaches us that a slave who has been set free must be given a letter of manumission by his/her owner. The owner already gave up on reacquiring that slave, and so the slave must be set free upon finding freedom. The letter of manumission assures that that a male slave is able to find a Jewish bride.
Master Shmuel had a maidservant who was captured. She was redeemed as a maidservant; that is, for those who believed that a freed slave is emancipated, she was only freed to return to her work with Shmuel. The rabbis discuss the importance of being freed. If one has no human authority of him/herself, then s/he is a freeman. Meaning that this maidservant was no longer a slave of Shmuel, but a free woman.
It seems that there was an interplay of political realities regarding slaves, redeeming slaves, being Jewish or a Gentile, being of any religion while owning a slave, etc. The rabbis teach that she needs the bill of manumission because of a number of reasons, including the fact that Gentiles might not want her any longer if she was a Gentile redeemed by a Jew.
The Gemara then notes different cases where a maidservant is not emancipated for different reasons. One, though she was performing sexual acts with many men (and her master was unable to end these behaviours) was not given a bill of manumission because we are told to hold our bondspeople for life. Another tells of a maidservant who was half-slave half-freewoman. She was freed by one master but not the other. The court ruled for both to free her, because people were performing sexual acts with her and it would be better for her to marry and cease tempting men with sin (from our notes).
The rabbis discuss whether it is ever appropriate to emancipate one's slave. Rabbi Yehuda points to Leviticus 25:46 - "of them you will take your bondsmen forever." However, does this mean that we cannot transgress a positive mitzvah in any circumstance? What if Rabbi Eliezer freed his slave to allow a minyan at a service? Can the requirement of one positive mitzvah override the requirement of another positive mitzvah? Don't we have to factor in whether or not these mitzvot are rabbinic?
When a slave is consecrated, it is his her monetary value that is consecrated and not his/her person (every person is assigned a monetary value based on status). Does that consecration automatically assume emancipation? The rabbis debate this question based on their lived experiences of selling slaves. The rabbis engage in a fascinating discussion about the sale of people. If a slave cannot be emancipated in one setting, might s/he be emancipated after being sold by the court to another person with the intention of emancipation?
More importantly, the rabbis ask whether a person can be a possession in the same way that other items are possessions. Could treasurers sell slaves when they were never truly consecrated, as an animal or another item of value might be consecrated? Could a slave free him or herself, given s/he had the money required to do so?
These questions are particularly interesting when we continually speak about the antiquated halachot of the times of the Talmud. One of our most commonly used examples is that of slavery. But they had slaves back then, we admit. This was not a progressive time. And yet here we see the rabbis questioning the logic of their system of people-ownership. How did that fit with Torah teachings; with other halachot of the day? It is wonderful to experience the rabbis' obvious discomfort with this ownership of human beings.
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