Ketubot 34: Cooking on Shabbat, accidental theft, and other examples of complex halachot

The Gemara continues to examine what should be done when we face competing principles or halachot.  

This begins with the case of an ox that has been killed improperly.  Does it count as a ritual slaughter? Or is it destroying someone's property?  To understand where to go, the rabbis look at one who cooks on Shabbat.  If that cooking is done intentionally or accidentally, the consequences differ.  Either way, the rabbis have a number of opinions about this case: possible results include dumping all of the food forever, allowing others to eat the food after Shabbat, allowing the cook to eat the food after Shabbat, allowing others to eat the food on Shabbat, and allowing oneself to eat the food on Shabbat.

The rabbis note the proof texts for these possibilities: Exodus 31:14 teaches "to observe Shabbat for Shabbat is sacred to you; one who profanes Shabbat is put to death".  These competing ideas - the necessity to observe Shabbat and the fact that Shabbat is holy to us - allow the rabbis to justify forbidding the food in question and excluding the cook from eating it himself.

The rabbis continue to look at factors that influence decisions in a number of cases.  They consider cases where an object has been stolen.  At what point is the thief actually stealing?  What happens if this is done on Shabbat?  What if the theft is of an animal on another's property but the animal is killed accidentally?  For what is the thief liable?  One of the more fascinating discussions concerns a burglar who breaks into a person's home.  The assumption is that the burglar has the intention to kill the homeowner.  This assumption gives the homeowner the right to kill the burglar.  As soon as the burglar enters the home, he assumes that status, and thus he is liable to death.  That status exempts him from a number of punishments, should he make it out of the home alive.  

As in many areas of Jewish law, it seems that those who know the law are at a great advantage over those who do not know the law.  If someone were bent on committing a crime, he could strategically plan his actions ensuring that he avoid the worst possible punishments: commit the crime on Shabbat, for example, depending on the specific halachot involved.

The rabbis note that they have different opinions regarding forewarning, as well.  Some rabbis believe that forewarning is equivalent to intentionality.  Others believe that even when a person is forewarned about the crime he is about to commit, his actions are not necessarily intentional.  This changes the potential consequences of those actions.

The arguments discussed in the Talmud are tremendously detailed and complex; today's overview does not even begin to comment on the brilliant arguments of our Sages.