Yevamot II 87: Widows, Possible Widows, Teruma, and Ketubot

We begin with a Mishna that describes when and how Israelite women are able to partake of tithes due to her children.  

The Gemara begins by noting that a seemingly superfluous letter "vav" in Leviticus 22:13 is proof for our rabbis that daughters are included with sons in one particular case.  A note reminds us that 22:11 is the verse that rabbis use to prove that women may eat of teruma when married into a family of Kohanim.  Yochlu, may eat, is also understood as meaning ya'achlilu, may feed.

Second, we are taught that the Jerusalem Talmud notes that the phrase bat u'vat can be understood as meaning both a priest's daughter and a female who observes the practices of kohanot.  Clearly our Sages are certain that women and men are both to be included in these observances.

The Gemara lists numerous sources in their discussion of whether or not a woman is permitted to partake of the breast and the right hind leg, the parts of an animal specifically reserved for kohanim.  Cases include Israelite women marrying priests and kohanot marrying Israelites.  They include the woman's rights to partake after they have children from one marriage, children from a second marriage, and children who have died.  They also include a discussion of what it might mean when a daughter leaves her father's house.  Rav Mordechai points out that it might seem odd to allow an Israelite woman to partake of the breast and hind leg while excluding a kohenet from doing the same.  

Although I've had my doubts when reading about sexual assault and abuse, it is evident here that our Sages are concerned about the welfare of women.  Women cannot provide for themselves.  Who is responsible for their housing, their food, their welfare?  The rabbis are creating clear guidelines to ensure that the community knows that individuals are accountable for women who intermarry.

Are pregnant women like other women with regard to access to the breast and the right hind leg?  The Gemara walks us through the rabbis' considerations.  Is a fetus a separate body within a woman's body or an individual, just like a child already born?  Is a pregnant woman allowed to be thought of as a youth, or is she automatically excluded from the rules applying to one in her youth?  How should the halachot be different regarding yibum and teruma?

The Gemara notes that Proverbs 3:17 states: Her ways are the ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace".  The rabbis use this to mean that all women should be treated with consideration.  Women should not force women who are already married to then perform chalitza; she should not be demeaned in front of her new husband.  Our notes teach that "pleasantness" does not mean that the Torah's halachot are pleasant.  However, they are fair and without discrimination.  A very interesting aside.

We enter into Perek X with a new Mishna.  If a woman was informed (by only one witness) that her husband has died while overseas and she remarries and her first husband returns, she is in big trouble.  Both relationships must in in divorce, all children lose their status, the women lose their rights to tithes, teruma, and ever marrying a priest (where applicable).  She also loses all of her belongings.  Rabbi Yosei disagrees.  She is allowed her ketuba from the first marriage.  Rabbi Elazar believes that her first husband retains rights to her possessions, her earnings, and her ketuba if desired.  Rabbi Shimon suggests that she is allowed to the second husband if he is a brother to the first; chalitza is not required and their child is not a mamzer.

If she was married the second time with the permission of the court, she is divorced from both men but does not bring a sin-offering for the court permitted the second marriage.  If the second marriage was performed without the consent of the court, she is permitted to return to her first husband, but must bring a sin-offering.  The rabbis suggest that she may in fact have to bring a sin-offering either way, for the court only permitted the second marriage and not 'licentious behaviour'.  

The Gemara speaks about witnesses.  It is unusual for one witness to be valid.  In this case, it seems that the rabbis are eager to allow women to remarry rather than wait for more conclusive evidence that a husband has died.  This makes sense in ordering a society: it could be 'dangerous' to have women who are 'in limbo' waiting around for their husbands...

One note about witnesses: we learn that a witness is more likely to be believed if s/he disputes a claim that would make him/her liable to bring a sin-offering.  In fact, even if two witnesses claim that a person has transgressed a sin (ex. eating forbidden fat), as long as the accused denies the claim, s/eh is not required to bring a sin-offering.

Today's daf has been a bit of a rollercoaster regarding my understanding of the Rabbis' views on women and their rights.