When women are suspected of adultery - this time because shoe prints are found, in various positions, at the foot of the matrimonial bed - Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi finds this so distasteful that she should be divorced. Rav believes that a witness is required. The rabbis discuss the power of rumours. Abaye teaches that his mother (step-mother) taught him that a rumour in a city lasts one and one-half days. The rabbis question whether divorce should be required if the rumours last longer than this. However, if the husband, wife, or suspected adulterer have known enemies, all bets are off. Our Sages go on to discuss when the rabbis say that the wife should be divorced if the husband remarried her after divorcing her because of rumours/reputation.
A new Mishna teaches that a witness is required to confirm a written get, bill of divorce, that is delivered overseas. The rabbis do not allow women to marry men who claim to have killed her husband, for that would suggest that wanting a married woman justifies murder. On the topic of witnesses, the rabbis discuss what should be done when a person claims that another person 'sodomized' him. The rabbis are not concerned with whether or not this was rape; as long as there is a witness, the accused is to be put to death. But if he is admitting to his own unlawful sexual behaviour, can he be trusted as a witness otherwise? We learn in a note that halacha "discard" the information that he was a participant in this act.
The rabbis note that they may be more lenient when dealing with the assumed death of a husband. Amud (b) brings us into a more detailed examination of witnesses. Do we believe people who incriminate themselves? Do we believe them in some cases but not in others? Do we believe people who admit that they were witness to crimes rather than part of those crimes?
Another new Mishna is introduced. We learn that Sages, who are court officials as well as scholars, face restrictions due to their posts. For example, he cannot marry a woman after he presided over her divorce. This would look as though he may have been impartial in his judgement granting her the get. But he is allowed to marry those who perform chalitza or refusal. In both of these cases, he is only one member of the court and not the presiding judge.
The Gemara ends our daf with a conversation about the number of judges required to allow one of those judges to marry the woman being judged. The rabbis wonder what should happen if a Sage marries a woman whom he should not marry. A note teaches us that the marriage is valid in these cases. Clearly the Sages are offered greater freedoms than those offered to the rest of society.
Today's text regarding anal sex is telling. The true sin seems to lie in the act of penetration. Why is that sin more meaningful than the sin of being the 'receiver' in this the sexual act? Perhaps a man in this role is considered to be emasculated to such a degree that he is in fact more like a woman than a man. In that case, his testimony would not count, nor would his version of the events - unless another witness was present. So is this hatred of male same-sex sexual behaviour about defining the role of men? Or is it about a hatred of women?
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