Sukka 30 a, b

Instead of speaking directly about a stolen lulav, the rabbis use examples based on stolen animals being used as offerings.  They tell of the state of despair that eclipses one who has been robbed.  They note that acqisition is marked by that state of despair plus the consecration of that animal.  Thus a stolen animal can truly be the possession of its robber.

But then we learn that Isaiah says that G-d hates robbery used as a burnt offering.  Based on "G-d's conduct" we should learn to hate robbery, particulary robbery used as an offering.  A lovely parable follows: a king who is travelling passes a tax collection station.  He orders his servants to pay the taxes. "But the taxes go to you," say the servants.  "Yes," says the king. "And the people should see me paying the tax and should use that as an example.  They will remember that "I the Lord love justice,  I hate robbery in a burnt offering." The king should model himself after G-d and the people should see that they too can be like G-d.

Going back to our Mishna, the rabbis consider how dry the lulav must be to be unfit.  And whether borrowing a lulav is permitted.  They also look at whether a stolen lulav is unfit only on the first day of the Festival or on all days.  Jews are not allowed to "steal" from trees, and the rabbis note that these trees could be sitting on land stolen by a gentile.  Thus we must be careful not to cut the four species ourselves.  I'm not sure why the rabbis specify a gentile thief and not simply a thief.  Did Jews not steal land?  If not, why not - was there some form of Jewish-based law or custom that discouraged this behaviour?

Amud (b) walks us through a complex set of ideas regarding acquisition.  As mentioned earlier in this daf, a stolen item can be 'aquired' by another person even after it has been stolen.  Despair is one possible ingredient.  Another is an action.  Now the rabbis discuss that idea in more depth.  Does the item change in some way?  If the stolen item can be reassembled, has it transitioned into a new state?  Or can it be returned, just as stolen boards can be built into a box and then disassembled and returned, unchanged, as boards?

What about binding the lulav?  Can that represent the acquisition of the item; the changing of a object.  After some debate, the rabbis agree that the binding of lulav is not an action that can bring on transition from one state to another.

The name of an object might change, too.  For example, the myrtle branch is called 'hoshana' when acting as part of a lulav.  The acts of placement and intention change the name and state of the myrtle.  This brings to mind our ancestor Jacob, who was renamed Israel.  That renaming was a mark of change; a representation of his change  of state from one form of himself to another.

I am not certain that I have fully grasped today's daf.  I look forward to learning more about our traditional understandings of today's daf.